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5.1 Introduction
In the study of the stock market's role in the economy, two closely
related questions arise. First, is the allocation of risk and capital that
er results from competitive trading in firm shares and debt efficient in some
appropriate sense? Second, what is or should be the objective of the firm?
The second question arises because the traditional profit maximization
hypothesis cannot be implemented when profits are uncertain as they will
be when contingent claims markets are incomplete. Incompleteness of
these markets is, in general, a feature of economies in which the only
institution for the exchange of risks is a stock market for firm shares. The
question of what a firm maximizes is not merely of intrinsic interest. In
•
fact, the study of stock market efficiency requires a model of firm be-
havior. If, in particular, we are interested in the efficiency of competitive
stock markets, the firm's behavior must be competitive in an appropriate
sense.
The present paper is intended as a contribution to the recent literature
• which focuses on the above-mentioned questions. Section 5.9 contains a
brief survey of this literature. A more complete survey is provided by
Baron (1979).
The initial work on the efficiency of a stock market is that of Arrow
(1953), which was subsequently elaborated by Debreu (1959). Arrow
Richard E. Kihistrom is professor of economics and finance at the University of Pennsyl-
vania, Philadelphia. Jean-Jacques Laffont is professor, Universitd des Sciences Sociales de
Toulouse.
Financial support from the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. The
authors would also like to thank Jacques Drèze, Sanford Grossman. Oliver Hart, Krishna
Ramaswamy, Hugo Sonnenschein, and participants at the 1978 Stanford Summer Work-
shop on Mathematical Economies for helpful comments.
141 • . . .
142 Richard E. Kihistrom/Jean-Jacques LafTont 143
y
assumed that Contingent claims markets were complete and showed that
the stock market allocation of risk was efficient in a first-best sense. exis
Debreu'S extension of Arrow's work incorporated production. Because and
he retained Arrow's assumption of complete contingent claims markets, the
Debreu could assume that firms maximized profits. Like Arrow, Debreu indif
was able to show that the competitive equilibrium was efficient.
The first paper to study stock market economies with production in
which the implied contingent claims markets were incomplete was by
Diamond (1967). Diamond suggested a concept of second-best efficiency decl
which he showed to be appropriate for use in judging the optimality of a capi
stock market. Using this concept,. he demonstrated the second-best mali
efficiency of the stock market allocation of risk and productive resources. defl
By restricting the technology to satisfy a condition that he called stochas-
tic constant returns to scale, Diamond was able, in an incomplete market
setting, to formalize the hypothesis of stock market value maximization ret'
as an extension of profit maximization. He therefore solved the problem inc
of specifying a criterion for a firm maximization by limiting the technolo- inc
gies under consideration. A subsequent paper by Leland (1974) showed
that under Diamond's assumption of stochastic constant returns to scale,
stockholders unanimously agree that stock market value maximization -
should be the firm's objective.
For our paper, as for virtually all of the "post-Diamond" literature,
Diamond's paper serves as the point of departure. We adopt his concept
of restricted efficiency and attempt to obtain analogues of his results in
situations characterized by technologies which do not exhibit stochastic
constant returns to scale. We assume that firms are created and run by e
expected utility maximizing entrepreneurs who simultaneously make ill
portfolio decisions on their own account and operating and financial in
decisions on their firm's account. This hypothesis of firm behavior is the irj
basis for our extension of Diamond's concept of equilibrium. In assuming al
that entrepreneurs maximize expected utility we are following Kihistrom
and Laffont (1979). In fact, the economy studied in this paper differs aJ
from that of Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) in only one respect: the
presence of a stock market which permits entrepreneurs to share the risks
associated with their firms.
In our theory the firm is competitive in the sense that entrepreneurs
take all prices as given. They are able to obtain capital, the only produc-
tive resource in our model, in a competitive bond market or by issuing
firm shares in a competitive stock market. Bond market competition I
implies that the price of debt is treated as given. Competition in the stock I
market is reflected in the fact that the relationship between a firm's
operating and financial decisions and its share value is treated parametri-
cally by all entrepreneurs.
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143 A Competitive Entrepreneurial Model of a Stock Market
In order to ensure that the model is competitive, we assume the
existence of a large number of individuals each of whom can create a firm
and become an entrepreneur. Following Aumann (1964), we introduce
the large numbers assumption formally by assuming a continuum of
individuals. The technology required by entrepreneurs is assumed to be
available to all, at a cost. Thus, entry is unlimited but not costless.
Other conditions appear to be necessary to ensure competition. Spe-
cifically, each entrepreneur who chooses a specific operating and financial
decision for his firm should face stock market competition for investor
capital. This will be true if there is a large number of entrepreneurs who
make the same choices and whose outputs are, in some sense, statistically
dependent. If outputs of two identical firms are independent, shares in
these firms are not perfect substitutes, and this tends to reduce competi-
tion. To ensure competition in the stock market, we assume that the
returns across firms are statistically dependent. We also assume that
individuals are divided into types and that there is a large number of
individuals of each type.
The formal structure of the model is presented in section 5.2.
The third section describes the roles played our theory by two
classical results and by the arguments traditionally employed to establish
these results. One of these results is the Modigliani and Miller (1958)
theorem, which asserts that, in equilibrium, financial decisions are
irrelevant. The other well-known result is that the equilibrium value of an
existing firm is the market value of the productive resources invested in its
creation and operation. These results arise as necessary conditions for the
equilibrium defined in section 5.2. They imply that, in equilibrium, all
individuals are indifferent between becoming entrepreneurs or remain-
ing nonentrepreneurs (capitalists, in our terminology). The proof given
in section 5.3 that these classical results are necessary for equilibrium is
an adaptation to our formal structure of the traditional arguments nor-
mally used to obtain them. The fundamental idea is that, in equilibrium,
any possibility of arbitrage profits must be eliminated. The Modigliani-
Miller theorem is necessary to prevent profitable arbitrage between debt
and equity. When the stock market value of a firm equals the value of the
resources it employs, arbitrage strategies involving firm entry or exit will,
of necessity, fail to earn profits.
The third section also discusses the role of price expectations in the
model. Since the shares of firms which are actually observed in equilib-
rium are traded, their expected price can be assumed to equal their actual
price. There will, however, be many operating and financial decisions
which could have been chosen but are not. These are identified with
potential firms about which individuals are assumed to have share price
expectations. For these potential (as opposed to existing) firms, the
4
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possibility of free entry determines only upper bounds on the expecta.
tions. The expectations at which these upper bounds are attained even for effiC4
potential firms will be referred to as classical expectations. They will play
a crucial role in the analysis which follows section 5.3. 5uffid
For the case of classical expectations, section 5.4 establishes the exjs-
tence of an equilibrium and describes its structure. The existence proof is
simplified by the fact that the model exhibits several special properties. mayi
These are described in the propositions and lemmas of section 5.4, Which it is
precede the existence theorem. In order to prove the existence theorem, whet
the special properties of the model are used to show that an equilibrium 5.6
can be identified with the equilibrium of a simple two-good pure trade UnCC
competitive economy, prod
The first result in section 5.4 is proposition 3, which asserts that optimal
portfolios of all individuals have an extremely simple form. Specifically, it
asserts that any entrepreneur's portfolio contains only shares in his Own
firm or in firms operated in the same way as his firm. Nonentrepreneurs,
i.e., capitalists, are shown to hold shares in only those firms which are mel
operated in the same way that they themselves would operate a firm if S
they were to become entrepreneurs. The optimality of nonçliversification tiOl
established in proposition 3 depends crucially on two assumptions: the to I
concavity of the production function in the variable or operating inputs,
and the statistical dependence of the outputs of all firms.
The next important result in section 5.4 is lemma 2, which implies that
a unique solution. This is cO
important for the proof of existence. The proof of lemma 2 is slightly 0t1
complicated because of a nonconvexity introduced by the fact that the (1
entrepreneur makes a portfolio decision for his own account as well as a
production decision on his firm's account. A related nonconvexity was
first observed by Drèze (1974).
The simplified structure of an equilibrium implied by proposition 3 is
described in proposition 4. In the equilibrium, there are as many types of
firms as there are types of individuals. There is, in essence, a type of firm
created for each type of investor. Each type of individual holds shares in
only the firms created by entrepreneurs of his type. This clientele effect
results in unanimity among the shareholders of every firm about the goals
the firm should pursue. This effect was discussed earlier by Smith (1970).
The remainder of section 5.4 transforms the equilibria with the simple
structure described in proposition 4 into equivalent equilibria of a two-
1 of this section uses this
transformation to obtain an equilibrium. This transformation is also the
basis for the efficiency theorem of section 5.5. In theorem 2 of that section
it is shown that the equilibrium is efficient in the second-best sense 'I
defined by Diamond (1967). The marginal conditions for Arrow-Debreu
first-best efficiency are stated in proposition 7 of section 5.5. These
S
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a- conditions are used to explain why, in general, the equilibrium is in-
or efficient in the Arrow-Debreu sense. Proposition 8 uses the marginal
ay conditions to prove that an equilibrium is first-best efficient if there are
sufficiently many risk neutral individuals or if all individuals are alike.
is- Section 5.6 argues that the equilibrium studied in this paper is an
is appropriate generalization of Diamond's model to the case in which there
may not be stochastic constant returns to scale. To support this assertion,
it is shown that the equilibrium studied here coincides with Diamond's
when the technology exhibits stochastic constant returns to scale. Section
m 5.6 also interprets our equilibrium as a generalization to the case of
le uncertainty of the classical model of perfect competition in which firms
produce at the point of minimum average cost. Our model is shown to
al reduce to the perfectly competitive equilibrium when there is no uncer-
it tainty.
Section 5.7 is the only section to consider equilibria with nonclassical
expectations. It conjectures that such equilibria exist and are, in general,
inefficient.
if Section 5.8 observes that our results can be interpreted as a demonstra-
tion that the need for a stock market only arises when there are fixed costs
e to entry, uncertainty, and risk aversion on the part a large number of
investors. It is shown that if one of these features is absent, the market in
firm shares is unnecessary since the economy can achieve the same
t allocation without a stock market. In a closely related sharecropping
.5 context in which there are no fixed costs, the irrelevance of a market for
y output shares has been demonstrated by Stiglitz (1974) and Newbery
(1977).
Section 5.9 contains a brief survey of recent literature and describes
s where our work fits within this literature. This survey includes a discus-
sion of an externality which arises in stock market economies because, as
s Smith (1970) and Drèze (1974) pointed out, the firm's production deci-
f sion is a public good for the shareholders.
5.2 Introduction to the Entrepreneurial Stock Market Model
There is a continuum of individuals each of whom is associated with a
point in the interval [0,1]. There are two goods: "capital," an input; and a
consumption good, "income." Each person begins with an endowment of
• A > 0 units of income and one unit of capital. These endowments of
capital and income are received without uncertainty. The fact that capital
is purely an input and not a consumption good is reflected in the fact that
income is the only argument in the, individual utility functions. Each
individual cx is assumed to have a twice differentiable von Neumann—
Morgenstern utility function u(I,ct) defined on [0,x) with positive and
nonincreasing marginal utility of income at all nonnegative income levels;
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i.e., u' > 0 and u"  0. At times, we will find it convenient to assume that )
u is strictly concave or even that u" < 0.
We will also make frequent use of the following assumption.
Al. There are n types of individuals, where n is a finite integer. For all
individuals of type i, there is a common utility function u(' ,i). Thus, if a is
of type i, we will let i(a) = i denote his type and his utility function will be
u(.,a) = u(.,i(a)).
The measure of the set of individuals of type i is denoted by For each i =
Note that our assumptions imply that
fig
Each individual can choose to be an entrepreneur or a capitalist. If he
becomes an entrepreneur, his capital endowment is expended on entre-
preneurial activities. By investing his capital in this way, the entrepreneur
obtains the income producing technology described by the production
function The first argument K in this function represents the
operating or variable capital employed by the entrepreneur in his firm. It
does not include the one unit of entrepreneurial capital which is the fixed
or set up cost of the firm. Thus, the total capital employed by the firm is K '9
+ 1, the operating capital plus the entrepreneurial capital. The second
argument is a random variable which influences the output of all firms.
A number of assumptions will now be made about g and First, to
avoid technicalities associated with differentiation under the integral, we
hypothesize that takes value in a finite subset X = {x1,. .
.
of some
finite dimensional subspace. Next, we assume that regardless of the level
of operating capital K, the worst that can happen is that there is no
output. Thus, for all x in X and all K  0, g(K,x)  0. If K = 0, output
must be zero for all possible x values; i.e., g(0,x) = 0 for all x E X. In
addition, there is assumed to be some x E X, say, x = x, for which g(K,x)
= 0 for all K  0. The assumption of existence of such an x is not essential
to the analysis. It is used primarily to simplify the discussion. We also
assume that for all K

0 and allx the marginal product is positive and
x.ItwiIl
be necessary to assume that for each x x, there exists a capital level
K(x) at which
(1) g(K(x),x) = [K(x) + 11.
For a specificx, K(x) is as shown in figure 5.1. Note that K(x) maximizes
g(K,x)
(1+K)'
I
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IK(x)+1]
=g (K(x), x)
Fig. 5.1
which is output per unit of capital. Similarly for any capital price r, K(x)
minimizes
r(l + K)
g(K,x)
which is the firm's average cost. Thus, by assuming that K(x) exists we are
in effect assuming that for each x, there exists an output level, specifically
g(K(x),x), at which average cost is minimized.
The random variable is assumed to be the same for all firms. It is
furthermore hypothesized that all individuals agree about the distribu-
tion off. This distribution is denoted by p. (In fact, this assumption can
be weakened somewhat when assumption Al holds. Specifically, it is
possible to assume only that all individuals of each type i agree about the
distribution of
The expenditure of entrepreneurial capital is, in essence, the payment
of a set up cost which transfers to the entrepreneur the technology
described by the production function. The entrepreneur thus becomes
the sole owner of the firm and is free to make all productive and financial
decisions associated with his firm's operation. Specifically, he can choose
the firm's investment level K as well as the debt-equity level. In addition
to making decisions on the firm's account, the entrepreneur will also be
faced with financial decisions to be made on his own account, He can, for
instance, sell some or all of the shares in his firm. The proceeds from this
sale can then either be held as what is essentially a safe asset or be used to
purchase shares in firms operated by other entrepreneurs. Because the
entrepreneur is initially the sole owner of the firm, he can make all of
these decisions, whether for his own account or the firm's, so as to further
his own personal interests, i.e., so as to maximize his own expected
utility.
4 L
g (K, x)
1 K(x)+1 K+1
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—1
Since our aim is to construct a competitive model of the stock and that
capital markets, we assume that the prices in these markets are fixed by thro
supply and demand and taken as given by all traders. Thus, a typical
entrepreneur a can either purchase all of the capital K(ct) he decides to (4)
employ at a price r (denominated in income terms), or obtain all or part of
this capital by the sale of his firm's shares in the competitive market for s1
these shares. If all of the firm's capital is purchased, its debt is rK(a) and shari
its profits will be
— rK(a).
obta
If, in addition, all of the shares to the firm are retained by the initial
owner, i.e., the entrepreneur, then he will receive all of these profits. If,
however, the entrepreneur decides to retain only -y(a) of the shares in his
firm, he can sell the remaining 1 — -y(a) shares for M(a)[1 -y(a)] units
of capital, where M(a) is the competitively determined market price for a priq
share in the firm. (Notice that we have assumed that the price of shares is
denominated in capital terms.) The capital proceeds from this sale either (5)
can be retained for the firm's account and used in production or can be No!
sold for the entrepreneur's private account. If it is sold for private
account, the entrepreneur may receive payment in different forms. On fird
the one hand, he can sell the capital directly in the capital market and
receive the price r. On the other hand, he can sell it in the markets for
shares to firms operated by other entrepreneurs. For example, he can buy —
a share in the firm run by 13 at a cost of M(13) capital units, where M(13) is
the competitive price of a share in 13's firm. wq
If S(a) units are retained for production on the firm's account, the
firm's debt is reduced from rK(a) to r[K(a) — S(a)]. The amount K(a) — lvii
S(a), which will usually be denoted by B(a), is the amount of capital the
firm raises by incurring debt. The firm's profits will then be aij
(2) B(a)) = g(K(a),i) — rB(a)
of which entrepreneur a will receive
(3)
Equation (2) makes it clear that two firms run by different entre- dl.
preneurs, say, a and 13, will generate identical profit distributions if K(a)
= KQ3) and B(a) = B(13). For this reason, we will assume that in an ii
equilibrium there is a function N,
N:
which relates a firm's capital input and debt capital levels to the price of a
the firm. Thus, if a firm employs K units of capital and raises B capital•
units by issuing debt, its price will be N(K,B). We are explicitly assuming
I
S
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nd that N is the same for all entrepreneurs. Thus, M(cx) depends on a only
by through K(a) and B(a); i.e.,
(4) M(a) = N(K(a),B(a)).
of In the remainder of the paper M(a) will always be given by (4).
Dr Suppose then that a employs K(a) units of capital and sells [1 — y(a)]
3d shares to the firm to obtain M(a)[1 — y(a)] units of capital. Also,
suppose that he finances B(a) units of capital purchase by issuing debt at a
cost of rB(a) to the firm. He must then retain K(a) — B(a) of the capital
obtained by the sale of shares for use in production by the firm. If the
remaining
M(a)[I — — [K(a) — B(a)}
:s units of capital are then sold on his personal account for income at the
a price r, the entrepreneur's income is
(5) A + r{M(a) [1 — y(a)J — [K(a) — 8(a)]} + [K(a),B(a)J.
e Note that this expression (5) for entrepreneur a's final wealth will also
hold if B(a) exceeds K(cx), i.e., if the entrepreneur issues debt on the
firm's account which exceeds that required to finance the firm's operating
I capital. If the excess capital [B(a) — K(a)] thereby obtained is then sold
on private account, the entrepreneur's final wealth is increased by r[B(a)
1
— K(a)J so that, as stated, (5) does represent final wealth. It should be
clear that the entrepreneur could use this procedure to increase his
wealth indefinitely unless either he is explicitly prohibited from using it or
the market responds to it by revaluing the firm when 8(a) is increased.
Modigliani and Miller have argued that the latter will happen, and we will
return to discuss how their arguments imply a relationship between M(a)
and B(a) which permits an equilibrium to exist.
We now want to assume that the entrepreneur buys shares in other
• firms. In the discussion of this case, a's holding of his own firm is treated
symmetrically with his holding of other firms. For the purpose of repre-
senting a's portfolio problem, let E be the (Lebesgue measurable) set of
entrepreneurs. If E'is a Lebesgue measurable subset of E, F(a,E') will
denote the (nonnegative) number of shares of firms in E' held by a. The
portfolio held by a is therefore represented by the nonnegative measure
['(a) defined on E and its Lebesgue measurable subsets.
In the discussion which follows, we will find it convenient to omit the
adjective "Lebesgue measurable" when referring to subsets of E and
functions with domain E. The reader should keep in mind, however, that
all such subsets and functions are assumed to be Lebesgue measurable. In
particular, for every Lebesgue measurable E' E, the function
F(',E') : E —* [O,Qc) is assumed to be Lebesgue measurable.
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—4,
In the terminology just introduced, the entrepreneur's portfolio prob-
lem is to choose a nonnegative measure ['(a). The restriction to nonnega- inc4
tive measures is an embodiment of the assumption that short sales are
impossible. This restriction is imposed to avoid the possibility that infinite
profits can be obtained by using strategies which involve short sales. This an•.
problem is known to arise in models similar to that being described here if
short sales are not ruled out or at least limited. (10
For the purpose of further interpreting ['(a), suppose that a chose to
invest in only two firms: his own and that run by 13. Then f(a,{a}) = -y(a)
> 0 would be the number of shares a holds in his own firm and ['(a,{13})> pri
o would be the number of shares he holds in firm 13. Since he holds only
these firms, f(a,E—{a,13}) = 0. A second example arises if a holds
shares in all firms and there exists a "density function" -y(a,13) > 0 such
that f(a,E') = f where p. is the Lebesgue measure. Then
-y(a43) can be interpreted as a's holding in firm 13.
Using the notation just introduced, the entrepreneur's random income (7i
is
(6) WE(K(a),B(a),F(a))=A +r{[M(a)
— f M(13)F(a,d13)J — [K(a) — B(a)J} + I
where, for each 13, including a, is defined by (2) and M(13)
= N(K(13),B(13)). If one recalls that our notation treats a's holding of
shares in his own firm symmetrically with his holding of shares in other
firms, it will be clear that (5) is the special case of (6) in which the
entrepreneur retains only shares in his own firm.
Entrepreneur a's problem then is to choose K(a), B(a), and ['(a) so as
to maximize
(7) Eu(WE(K(a),B(a),['(a)),a).
In order to avoid the problems associated with bankruptcy, this choice
is assumed to be made subject to the constraint that (6) be nonnegative
with probability one. Since g(K,x) 0, this will be true if and only if
(K(a), B(ct), ['(a)) satisfies
(8) A + r{M(a) — f[M(13) + B(13)]F(a,d13) — LK(a) — B(a)J}O.
Note that in solving this problem, a is assumed to recognize that the
price M(a) of his firm will be related to its capital input and debt level by
(4). He also takes the share price M(13) and the decisions (K(13), B(I3)) of
all other entrepreneurs 13 E E as given.
Capitalists face a decision problem which is analogous to the entre-
preneurs'. Specifically, either capitalists can sell their capital for income,
receiving r income units for each capital unit sold, or capital can be
exchanged for shares in firms at the competitive prices M(13) =
I
e
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ob- BQ3)). When the portfolio ['(a) is chosen, capitalist a's random
ga- income is
(9) Wc(['(a)) = A + r[1 — I M(13)F(ct,d13)] + I
and he chooses ['(a) to maximize
eif
(10) Eu(Wc(['(a)),a).
to For capitalists, the problem of bankruptcy is avoided by assuming that
:a) ['(a) is chosen subject to the constraint that (9) be nonnegative with
probability one. This is true if and only if
(11) A + r[1 — f[MQ3) + ['(a, d13)1  0.
ch Note that in (9) and (10) a is not included in E; thus, he must take as
en given the profit variables of every firm in which he may
invest. This situation is to be contrasted with that represented by (6) and
• ne (7) in which a E E and can make a simultaneous choice of B(a))
and ['(a).
Individual a will be an entrepreneur if and only if
(12) max Eu(IVE(K(a), B(a), ['(a)), a)  max Et2(Wc(['(a)), a);
K(a)O
B(c)
F(a)O
he will be a capitalist if and only if the inequality in (12) is reversed.
Having defined E as the set of entrepreneurs, we will let C be the set of
capitalists.
Definition 1. A competitive stock market entrepreneurial equilibrium
(CSMEE) is a partition {E, C} of [0,1J, a capital price r E [0, + cc), and
functions N: [0,+oo) x (—cc, +cc), K: E—* [0,+cc), B:
(—cc, +cc), 1': [0,11 the set of nonnegative measures on the Lebesgue
measurable subsets of E, such that (i) (12) holds for each a E E and (12) is
reversed for each a E C, (ii) (K(a),B(a),['(a)) maximizes (7) subject to
(8)for each a E E, (iii) ['(a) maximizes (10) subject to (1 1)foreach a E C,
(iv) f0' = for each subset E' of E, and (v)
=
In this definition, condition (iv) expresses the equality of supply and
demand in the market for shares for firms. If, for example, there is a
density function such that, for each a and E',
['(a,E') =
then, the supply equals demand condition
f'y(a, 13)p.(da) = 1, for each 13,
implies that
I
I
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=
capita
as required by (iv). ren(.
Condition (v) in definition 1 asserts that capital supply equals capital ndivt
demand. the 4
5.3 The Function N and the Modigliani-Miller Theorem (K,
In this section we will use adaptations of familiar arguments to obtain (13)1
restrictions on the function N which are necessary for the existence of an
equilibrium. These conditions will on the one hand facilitate the inter-
pretation of the function N and on the other hand simplify the following for
discussion of existence of equilibrium. In this discussion, there is one
particular N function which will play a crucial and classical role. This A1
function will be denoted by Nc and is defined by of
Nc(K,B)=1+KB.
When this function describes the market valuation of firms employing
any operating capital level K of which any amount B is raised as debt, the
equilibrium exhibits two classical properties. First, it is impossible to earn
arbitrage profits by setting up a firm and then selling all of the shares at pre
the market price. In fact, this type of arbitrage will be unprofitable when mO
and only when N(K,B)  Nc(K,B). For if a firm is set up which employs
K units of operating capital and issues debt to raise B of these capital
units, the entrepreneur will have invested 1 + K — B units of equity ret
capital. If N(K,B) s Nc(K,B), the market value (in capital terms) of the cal
firm created with this investment is no larger than 1 + K — B. Thus, an
investment of 1 + K — B units of equity capital has resulted in the
creation of an asset with a capital value smaller than or equal to the w'
investment. The result is no profits. Profits are possible, however, if w
N(K,B) exceeds Nc(K,B). For in this case an investment of 1 + K — B
units of equity capital creates a firm with a market value in excess of 1 +
d
The second well-known result implied by the fact that N(K,B) = al
Nc(K,B) for all (K,B) is the Modigliani-Miller theorem, which has two
important consequences. The first is that N(K,B) + B, the value of the
firm (in capital terms), is constant for all firms employing the same level n
of operating capital K. In fact,
S
This equality asserts that the capital value of the firm equals the total
capital invested in it, a simple restatement of the no arbitrage profits
condition just discussed. The second consequence of Modigliani and
Miller's theorem is that all individuals—the entrepreneur as well as all
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potential and actual investors—are indifferent about B, the debt financed
capital level. Since B is the sole financial decision made by the entre-
preneur on the firm's account, the firm's financial policy is irrelevant to all
tal individuals. This universal indifference to B is a simple consequence of
the expressions for Wc and WE which emerge when 1 + K — B is
substituted in (6) and (9). In particular, when N(K,B) = NC(K,B) for all
(K,B), then
in
(13) WE(K,B,I') = A + r[1 — +
— rK(t3)]f(dt3) = A + r[1 _ fE[1 + K(13)]r(d13)] +
for all (K,B,F). Notice that for no firm 13 does B(13) appear in the
expressions given for WE(K,B,IT) and Wc(F).
is Another important consequence of N(K,B) = Nc(K, B) is the equality
of WE(K,B,f) and Wc(I') expressed in (13). In writing this equality, it
was implicitly assumed that K E {K(13): 13 E E}, which means, in effect,
that the set 13 E E}, and therefore the availability of investment
g opportunities, is the same for both entrepreneurs and capitalists. This
e equality implies that once {KQ3): 13 E E} is determined, all individuals are
a indifferent between being entrepreneurs and capitalists. Of course entre-
t preneurs are able to choose K and B for their own firms and thereby
influence {K(13): 13 E E}, the set of investment opportunities. Further-
S more, the (K,B) choice is made simultaneously with the choice of a
• portfolio. This is a choice not available to capitalists as long as they
remain capitalists. Because entrepreneurs have an option not open to
capitalists, it appears that, in spite of (13), some individuals may strictly
prefer the former role to the latter. But capitalists who are not satisfied
with the investment opportunities available from existing firms can al-
ways choose to become entrepreneurs and thereby create new firms in
which to invest. Thus, not only are K, B, and I' chosen simultaneously by
entrepreneurs, but all individuals choose F at the same time that they
decide whether to be entrepreneurs or capitalists. Any individual who is a
capitalist in equilibrium has chosen not to exercise the option to become
an entrepreneur. This choice indicates satisfaction with the investment
opportunities made available by other entrepreneurs. Thus, in an equilib-
rium characterized by N(K,B) = Nc(K,B), the entrepreneur's ability to
make a (K,B) choice not available from other entrepreneurs is super-
fluous, and all individuals are indifferent between being entrepreneurs
and capitalists.
The equilibria on which this paper focuses are those in which N(K,B)
= Nc(K,B) for all possible (K,B) choices. There are, however, other
equilibria in which this equality may fail to hold at some (K,B) choices.
But even in these other equilibria N and are closely related. This
relationship will be described by two propositions which are stated and
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proved in the remainder of the present The first proposition
asserts that Nc serves as an upper bound above which the equilibrium N ever4
can never rise. This proposition is proved by demonstrating that if N rises capit
above Nc for any (K,B) choice, then every individual will, in preference equii
to remaining a capitalist, create a firm employing K units of operating
capital and raising B of these capital units with debt. As noted above, this Al
type of arbitrage operation is profitable if and only if N(K,B) exceeds
Nc(K,B). When all individuals attempt to exploit these profitable arbi..
trage possibilities, all capital is used as entrepreneurial capital; none Wej
remains to satisfy the demand for operating capital. Thus, equilibrium thel
the capital market is inconsistent with N(K,B) > Nc(K,B) at any possible ing i
(K,B) choice, act!
The second proposition is somewhat weaker. It asserts that at the
equilibrium (K,B) levels, N(K,B), in fact, equals Nc(K,B). To be per- pr9.
fectly correct, it can only be said that for almost all entrepreneurs a, chq
N(K(a),B(ct)) = Nc(K(a),B(a)). We will now state and prove these rinl
results and then return to a discussion of the difficulties created by the fact taq
that, in some equilibria, N may differ from Nc. ho!
Proposition 1 (Modigliani-Miller). In a CSMEE, prc
(14) N(K, B) 1 + K - B
for all possible (K,B) choices (not just the equilibrium choice).
Proof. If (14) fails because at some (K,B) (1
(15) N(K,B)>1+K—B,
then (15), (6), and (9) imply that, for any F(a),
Wc(['(a)) = A + r[1 —
f — [K — Bj}
+ (KQ3), B(13))I'(a, d13) = WE(K, B,
Thus, the random income achievable by becoming an entrepreneur is
sure to exceed the random income obtainable as a capitalist for every
choice of f(a). In making this statement, it was assumed that a chose the
same portfolio after he became an entrepreneur that he chose before
becoming an entrepreneur. This is clearly possible for an entrepreneur
even though the existence of his own firm creates a new investment
opportunity, i.e., one which was not available when he was a capitalist. It
is possible because both as an entrepreneur and as a capitalist, a takes the
capital input choices of other firms as given and because the entrepreneur
can always sell the one share in his own firm for N(K,B) to obtain the
portfolio. Inequality (16) asserts that a will be sure to have more income
after becoming an entrepreneur, employing K, issuing rB as debt on the
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firm's account, and then selling the firm to buy r(a). Because of this,
N every individual will prefer to be an entrepreneur rather than to remain a
es capitalist, but then = 0 and condition (v) in the definition of an
ce equilibrium must fail to hold. Thus, N could not be an equilibrium price if
ng (15) holds for some (K,B). QED.
As remarked earlier, proposition 1 implies that, for all (K,B),
ds N(K,B) Nc(K,B).
)1—
We can now show that for those (K,B) which appear in the equilibrium
in the upper bound becomes effective. The proof proceeds by demonstrat-
le ing that no entrepreneur will ever choose a (K,B) at which N(K,B) is
- actually less than Nc(K,B). He will always prefer to be a capitalist
instead. A complication arises here which did not appear in the proof of
r- proposition 1. The problem occurs because an individual a who would
choose (K(a), B(a)) if he were an entrepreneur may be unique in prefer-
ring that choice. If he chooses to be a capitalist, he eliminates an impor-
tant investment opportunity. This problem is avoided if assumption Al
holds. Under this assumption, no individual a is ever unique in his
preference for a specific (K(a), B(a)). Thus, no individual who chooses to
be a capitalist eliminates an investment opportunity which other entrep-
reneurs will not provide for him.
Since N(K(a), B(a)) = Nc(K(a), B(a)) for almost all entrepreneurs a,
(13) holds and almost all individuals are indifferent between being work-
ers and capitalists.
Proposition 2 (Modigliani-Miller). Suppose that Assumption Al holds.
In a CSMEE,
(17) N(K(a),B(a)) = 1 + K(a) — B(a)
for almost all (Lebesgue measure) a E E. Furthermore, in equilibrium
almost all individuals of the same type have the same expected utility; i.e., if
u(',cx) = u(•,a') and a E E while cx' E C, then
(18) max Eu(Wc(F(a')),a') = rnaxEu(WE(K(a),B(a),F(a)),a)
1(a) 1(a)
K(a)
B(a)
or if u(.,a) = u(',a') and a and a' are in E, then
(19) max Eu(WE (K(a), B(a), ['(a)), a)
1(a)
K(a)
B(a)
= maxEu(WE(K(a'),B(a'),F(a')),cx').
1(a)
K(a')
B(a)
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Thus, condition (12) must hold with an equality for all individuals who
will therefore be indifferent between being entrepreneurs and capitalists.
The proof of this proposition is contained in appendix 1.
Because N = Nc only at equilibrium choices for (K,B), it is not always tiot
true that investors are indifferent about a firm's B choice. If a significant ex4
number of firms employ K(a) units of operating capital and choose to
raise B(x) capital units through debt, then ass
N(K(a),B(cx)) = 1 + K(a) — B(a).
But there may be some other B level at which
N(K(a),B)<1+K(a)—B.
In that case, B(a) is definitely preferred to B. If, however, there is also a
significant number of firms which choose (K',B') with K' = then a
N(K(a),B(a)) + B(a) = N(K(a),B') + B' =1 + K(a)
and all individuals are indifferent between the financial decisions B(a)
and B'.
As mentioned above, the analysis to follow will concentrate on the case Pa
in which
sd(20) N(K,B)Nc(K,B)
for all (K,B). We will demonstrate the existence of such equilibria. We
will also show in section 5.5 that the equilibria in which (20) always holds b
are efficient in the restricted sense of the term introduced by Diamond
(1967). It will furthermore be seen in section 5.7 that there may exist
many other equilibria in which (20) does not always hold and that many of
these equilibria may be inefficient. These facts underline the central role ti
of the function Nc as well as the importance of providing a satisfactory
interpretation for the function Nc to justify the assumption that N =
For (K,B) levels which are observed in a particular equilibrium,
N(K,B) is easily interpreted as the, observed price of shares of firms
employing K operating capital units and raising B of these units as debt.
If, in equilibrium, no firm chooses (K,B), then N(K,B) must be inter-
preted as the price individuals expect to prevail if such firms are intro- (.
duced. It might be thought that if the expectations N are to be "rational"
or self-fulfilling, then N must equal Nc everywhere. Whether this is true
depends on the sense in which the expectations are rational. Suppose,
first, that N is rational in the sense that if N(K,B) is expected to be the
price of shares in a firm which chooses (K,B) and if a significant number
of entrepreneurs (a set of positive Lebesgue measure) do, in fact, choose
(K, B), then the actual equilibrium price of their firms is N(K,B). This is a
rather weak form of the rational expectations hypothesis, since it only
requires actual fulfillment of expectations at (K,B) levels observed in
I
4 .
157 A Competitive Entrepreneurial Model of a Stock Market
'ho
equilibrium. For (K,B) pairs not chosen by a significant number of firms,
ts
the expectation N(K,B) is never confirmed by observation because shares
I of firms choosing (K,B) are never exchanged at N(K,B). But the expecta-
tion N(K,B) is never refuted either, since shares of these firms are never
exchanged at prices other than N(K,B).
to Using this rational expectation interpretation of N, proposition 1
asserts that an expectation of N(K,B) > Nc(K,B) can never be fulfilled.
Proposition 2 asserts that for (K,B) choices observed in equilibrium, the
only N which is rational is N(K,B) = Nc(K,B). In view of these proposi-
tions, an expectation N(K,B) <Nc(K,B) can be rational in the sense just
described if no significant number of firms choose to employ K units of
operating capital and raise B of these units with debt. And, in fact, an
equilibrium in which (20) fails to hold at some (K,B) can be interpreted as
a case in which this situation arises. Thus, the rational expectations
interpretation just presented is not sufficient to justify the assumption
that (20) holds everywhere.
There is a stronger form of the rational expectations hypothesis which
can be used to justify the assumption that (20) holds everywhere. In
se ' particular, we could interpret rationality to require that the equilibrium
expectation N(K,B) actually be confirmed, or at least confirmable in
some sense, at all (K,B) levels. We could, for example, argue that
individuals who understand the economy and its operation will, in es-
sence, know proposition 2; i.e., they will know that if a (K,B) is going to
Is be observed in any equilibrium, it must be true that (20) holds at (K,B).
Sophisticated individuals will thus know that the only price expectations
st N(K,B) that can ever be confirmed by observation are N(K,B) =
)f and that for other expectations the most that can be said is that
they can never be refuted by observation. If we ask that rational expecta-
tions have this potential for confirmation, then N(K,B) = Nc(K,B) is the
unique rational price expectations function.
Is
t. 5.4 Properties of the Equilibria
The purpose of this section is to describe the properties of the entre-
preneurial stock market equilibria and show that such equilibria exist. As
e mentioned above, this is done under the assumption that (20) holds at all
(K,B) levels. In this case, (13) implies that any entrepreneur a can be
e regarded as maximizing the special case of (7) in which M(13) = 1 and
r K(!3) = for all p, including a, in E. When (20) holds for all (K,B),
(13) also implies that capitalists maximize the special case of (10) which is
1'Ia also obtained by setting 1 and K(13) B(13) for all 13 E E. Thus,
fr entrepreneur a chooses K(a)  0 and ['(a)  0 subject to (8) (with B(13)
= K(13) for all 13 E E) so as to maximize
S
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(21) Eu(A + r[1 _fE[1 + K(13)]f(a,d13)j +fg(K(13),x)F(a,d13),a).
If a is a capitalist, he takes K(13) as given for all 13 E E and chooses F(a)
0 to maximize (21) subject to (11) (with = K(13) for all 13 EE).
Using this simplification, we first show that the decision problems of dis
capitalists and entrepreneurs can be substantially simplified. Specifically ob
we show that no entrepreneur a will ever hold shares in a firm which
employs capital in an amount which differs from his own optimal capital
demand K(a). Furthermore, because the x's are the same for all firms,
each entrepreneur considers a partial share in his own firm as a perfect
substitute for a partial share in any other firm which employs capital at the
level which is optimal for him. As a consequence of these results, we will an1
be able to assume that the entrepreneur's problem is to choose K(ct) and
y(a) to maximize the expected utility of his income which is related to rn
these decisions by the special case of (5) in which B(a) = K(a). Formally,
entrepreneur a's problem is then to choose K(a)  0 and -y(a) 0 so as to
maximize arj
st,1
(22) = Eu(A + r[1 — 'y(a)]
The special case of (8) which restricts the entrepreneur's (K(a),-y(a)) asl
choice is
(23) A + r[1 — y(a)(l + K(a))]0.
We will denote the solution to this problem by
By similar arguments, analogous results can be established for the aJ
capitalist. That is, we can show that if there is an existing firm which is 01
operated in the same way that a particular capitalist a would run it—i.e., P
which chooses to employ the same amount of capital a would employ if he
were to become an entrepreneur—then a will hold shares only in that P1
firm and others run the same way. Furthermore, for a, shares in all firms
operated in this way are perfect substitutes. Because of these results, we
will be able to assume that the capitalist's problem is to choose -y(a) so as
to maximize his expected utility when his income is related to this deci-
sion by the special case of (5) in which B(a) = K(a) and K(a) is the
capital level which he would choose if he were an entrepreneur. For-
mally, then, the capitalist chooses -y(a)  0 to maximize (22) where K(a)
= K(a), and this choice is made subject to the constraint (23). L
Lemma 1. Assume that N satisfies (20). If K(a) = K(a'), then any
investor 13, whether he is an entrepreneur or a capitalist, is indifferent when
choosing between portfolios ['(13) for which I'(13,{a'}) + I'(13,{a}) = t
where S is some positive constant.
Proof. When K(a) = K(a') = K and I'(13,{a'}) + = 5,
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— rK(a)] + — rK(a')]
Thus, each portfolio satisfying the hypothesis of the proposition yields a
s of distribution of returns which is the same as the distribution of returns
ally obtained by holding shares in either firm a or firm a'. QED.
iich ,,Prop9sition 3. Assume that N satisfies (20), and that A.1 holds. Let
'ital t(a)) maximize (7) subject to K(a)  0, ['(a)  0, and (8). Let 4, =
rflS, (a' : K(a') = k(a)}. Then R(a) = R(a), t(a,I,,) = and t(a,E
:ect
the = 0 where (K(a),-y(a)) maximizes (22) subject to K(cx)  0,  0,
and (23). Thus, an entrepreneur invests only in firms which are run as he
md runs his own firm and he chooses 0 and K(a) 0 subject to (23) to
to maximize (22). (If in equilibrium > 1, he must be interpreted as
investing in at least one other firm which employs K(a).)
For any a E C, let 'a {a' E E: K(a') = K(a)}, where K(a) and
are assumed to maximize (22) subject to (23) and the nonnegativity con-
straints. In equilibrium, 'a is not empty; i.e., there is some entrepreneur
who runs his firm as a would if a were an entrepreneur; F(a,I,,,) =
and f(a,E 4,) = 0.
Remarks. Proposition 3 can be interpreted as asserting that the
assumption of a concave production function and the assumption that is
the same for all firms together imply that all of the possibilities for
diversification available in the stock market are dominated by the invest-
ment opportunities available through the production function. However,
in order to exploit these opportunities, it may be necessary to retain only
me a partial share of the output from the production function or, if-y exceeds
is one, to receive a multiple of the output from the production function.
The latter can be achieved by replication of a firm.
The mathematical result which is given a stock market interpretation in
it proposition 3 was obtained earlier and given a closely related sharecrop-
is ping interpretation by Newbery (1977).
e We are indebted to Sanford Grossman for suggesting the idea of the
simple proof which appears below. Note that this proof does not require
differentiability of u org. Our original proof was substantially longer and
e did use arguments which depended on differentiability.
It should also be emphasized that the assumption that is the same for
) every firm is crucial to the proof of this result. If were a different
random variable for each firm, individual investors would find it advan-
tageous to hold diversified portfolios; i.e., the stock market would aug-
I ment the diversification possibilities available with the production func-
tion.
Proof. Jensen's inequality and the strict concavity of g for each x x
imply that for any portfolio ['(a) and for each x
4
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-V
whj
(24) F(a,E) g ,x —r
F(ct,E) F(a,E)
r and
—
Thus, any entrepreneur or capitalist can obtain higher returns in each
state x by becoming an entrepreneur employing
I'(a,E)
units of operating capital and holding only f(a, E) shares in his own fIrm
than he can by holding any diversified portfolio f(a). Note that the cost of + I
F(a, E) shares in his own firm is the same as the cost of the portfolio F(a).
QED. bel
Proposition 3 reduced the entrepreneur's problem to one of maximiz- thi
ing, by his (K(a),-y(a)) choice, (22). It also showed that the capitalist is
faced with a simple choice of -y(a) for a fixed K(a) level. The next lemma
shows that if solutions to both of these problems exist, they are unique.
Lemma 2. Assume that N satisfies (20) and that u is strictly concave. If
there exists a choice which maximizes (22) and for which
K(a) > 0, it is unique.
Remark. In standard proofs, uniqueness follows from strict concavity
of the criterion function. In the present context, this approach is inappli-
cable because is not concave in It is, however, strictly d
concave in K(ct) and in -y(a). These facts can be easily verified by
differentiation when u and g are twice differentiable and when u is strictly
concave. If u" < 0, the uniqueness of can nevertheless be
demonstrated by showing that, in spite of the nonconcavity of the
second-order sufficient conditions for a maximum are satisfied at any t
which satisfy the first-order conditions. Functions which
have this property are referred to as strictly pseudoconcave and have I
unique maxima. The proof of pseudoconcavity of requires that be
twice differentiable. It is, however, possible, using the proof which
follows, to prove uniqueness of directly and simply without
assuming differentiability.
When u is concave but not necessarily strictly concave, a similar
argument implies that K(a) is unique. In this case, is not necessarily
unique.
Proof. Suppose that there exist two maximizing choices
and (K2(a), with, say, K1(a) > 0. Then, as in the proof of proposi-
I
tion 2, the strict concavity of g for each x x, implies that for any t E
(0,1) and for any x x,
— rK1(a)] —
+ (1— — rK2(a)],
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= + (1 —
and
+ (1-
3ch = + (1 —
Thus,
Eu(A + r[l — -y,(a)] + — rK,(ct)],a)
rm (25) > Eu(A + r[l — (1 — t)'Si2(a)j
+ — rk1(a)] + (1 — — rK2(ct)1,ct)
because of the monotonicity of u. Now the strict concavity of 14 implies
iz- that
is Eu(A + r[1 - - (1- + - rk1(a)J
e. + (1- -
(26) >tEu(A + r[l - + -
ty
+ (1 — t)Eu(A + r[l — j'2(a)] + — rK2(ci)],a)
Ii- = =
Combining (25) and (26) implies that
Jy =
Thus, neither nor can maximize a con-
tradiction. QED.
Lemmas 1 and 2 and propositions 1—3 can now be used with assumption
Al and the assumption that u is concave to simplify substantially the
structure of a CSMEE. The simpliflcations are described in proposition 4,
which follows. Before stating the proposition, it is useful to recall that p,
it represents the measure of the set of individuals of type i who have the
common utility function u(.,i). If i = i(x), we define H = He'.
Proposition 4. Suppose that (20) holds at all (K,B) and that assumption
Al holds. Then in a CSMEE there are
)
(27) v =
entrepreneurs who operate firms which employ K, units of capital, where
E K is the capital demand which together with -y, maximizes the function H
defined by (22) for type i individuals. Since is the demand for shares by
each of the p, type i individuals, (27) expresses the equality of supply and
demand as required by (iv) of definition 1. < 1, then v, < p., and there
are fewer firms of type i than individuals of type i. All individuals of type i
162 Richard E. Kihistrom/Jean-Jacques LalTont 163
are indifferent between being capitalists and entrepreneurs. Thus, any V1 of to
the p., type i individuals will be entrepreneurs. The remaining p., — v, type i taine4
individuals will be capitalists. If-y,> 1, then v,> and there must be more T
firms of type i than there are individuals of type i. The entrepreneurs for v• letti
— p., of these firms can be of some typej i. These individuals of type j can
become entrepreneurs, choose K as the capital levelfor their firm, and sell (32)
their one unit share in the firm. If they set = K, then they will receive 1 and
capital unit for the firm and they will be in the same position as a capitalist
of type j. They will then hold -y, shares in afirm run by some entrepreneur of (33)1
typej.
The condition that capital supply equals capital demand is It is
n n (23)!
(28) £ v
(34)1
or
n
(29) £ v.(1 + K1) = 1,
which becomes . I
(30) + = 1
(36j
when (27) is substituted. Because of (30), -y, cannot exceed one for all i.
The proposition follows immediately from lemmas 1 and 2 and proposi-
tions 1—3. The following corollary is also immediate.
m
Corollary to proposition 4. If(20) holds at all (K,B) and assumption Al
holds with n = 1, then in a CSMEE, I
1 BI
(31)
a
a CSMEE if, for each i, -9,) maximizes H' and if and K, satisfy
(30). re
This simplification will prove to be essential in the demonstration that
an equilibrium exists. Another essential step in this demonstration is a
transformation of each individual's maximization problem. This trans- (3
formation serves two purposes. On one hand, it reduces the individual j
maximization problem to a form in which the existence of a solution is TI
more easily obtained. On the other, it makes it possible to reduce the
problem of finding a CSMEE to one of finding a competitive equilibrium
in a simple two-good pure trade economy. These reductions in turn
permit the application of familiar arguments to obtain an equilibrium.
An appealing feature of the transformation of the individual maximiza- Wi
tion problem and of the equilibrium is the alternative interpretation of
the CSMEE which results. In the present paper we will pause only briefly 1
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of to discuss this alternative interpretation. An extended discussion is con-
pe i tamed in a subsequent paper (Kihistrom and Laffont 1980).
ore The first part of the transformation referred to is accomplished by
letting
can (32) C = YI[1 + K,]
sell
'e 1 and defining a function F' by
tlist g(K1,.t)
rof (33) A + r[1 — C1] + C,
[1 + K1]
It is easily shown that if (k,, -jr,) maximizes H' subject to K,  0,  0, and
(23), then Ic, and
(34)
maximize F' subject to K  0, C1  0, and
• (35) A+r[1—C,JO.
Similarly, if (Ic,, maximize F' subject to K  0, C1  0, and (35), then
Kand
C.
(36)
I
'i. [1+K1J
.si-
maximize H' subject to K,  0,  0, and (23). It is also easily shown that
the uniqueness of (R,,C,) is equivalent to the uniqueness of (K,,-9,).
The function F1 and the variable C1 can be interpreted by assuming that
B, = 0, i.e., by assuming that all capital'is equity capital and that equity
capital can be supplied by either the entrepreneur or others. In that case,
all of the firm's capital, [1 + K1], is obtained in return for equity. The
amount C, can be interpreted as the equity capital supplied by each
Y individual of type ito firms of type i, i.e., those employing K,. When C is
• related to and K, by (32), i will receive a share of which equals
(37)
= 1
is Thus, the income i receives from firms of type i in state x is
C g(K. x)
n (38) C1[l'K].
Now if individuals of type i decide to supply an amount C, ofequity capital
which is less than the one unit of capital with which they are endowed,
they will have (1 — C,)r capital units that can be sold at the price r to
individuals of other types. If C, is chosen to exceed the one-unit capital
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endowment, then (C1 — 1) capital units will have to be purchased at the
price r from individuals of other types. In either case, (1 — C.)r units of
income will be added to the share (38) received from firms of type i.
course, when C, exceeds one, this addition results in a reduction of r(C1
1) in the income consumed.
Notice that when (32) is substituted in (30), the result is
(39)
which asserts that the total equity capital supplied is equal to the econ-
omy's total supply of capital. Equation (38) can also be written as
(40)
Note also that (32) and (27) imply
(41) v,(l + K,) =
Since v,(l + K.) is the total capital demand by all firms of type i and is
the total equity capital supplied by type i individuals, (41) expresses the
equality of supply and demand for equity capital to typt i firms.
The transformation just described permits us to interpret a CSMEE as
the equilibrium of an economy in which capital can be either sold or
supplied to firms for equity. The share of output received from a firm is
proportional to the share of equity capital supplied to that firm. For each
type i there are firms which employ the K, desired by type i individuals.
Specifically, the type i firm employs K, which together with maximizes
F' defined by (33). The number of firms of type i is v,. Since v, satisfies
(41), there is an equality of the supply of and the demand for equity
capital for type I firms. Because of (40), or equivalently (39), there is also
an equality of supply of and demand for capital across types. Note in fact
that (39) can, using (41), be written as (29), which asserts that total firm
demand for capital equals supply.
Note that if there were no uncertainty, each firm would maximize
output per unit of capital in order to maximize F'. This criterion is
analogous to the criterion employed in models of labor management. In
that literature, labor managed firms are assumed to maximize output per
worker. Because of this analogy, we use the term capital management
equilibrium (CME) to refer to a vector (((K1, if, for each i,
(K1, C) maximizes F1 and if (39) holds.
Having defined F', C' and a CME, we have only completed the first
step in the transformation used to obtain the existence of (K1, -i,) and of a
CSMEE. The second step is to solve the problem of maximizing F'
sequentially. We first demonstrate in lemma 3 below that for each C,
there exists a K(C,) which maximizes F'(K1, C). It is then shown in lemma
1=1
j65 I
—1'
F'(Ki!
prod
riumi
ecOflt
this
th
del
Nt
w
I
I
atthe
flits of
e i. Of
econ-
Is
.•çis
s the
IE as
d or
mis
each
ials.
izes
;fies
uity
also
• fact
irm
ize
is
In
ent
rst
fa
165 A Competitive Entrepreneurial Model of a Stock Market
that for certain values of r, there exists a which_ maximizes
F'(K1(),). This accomplished, it is easily seen that C1 = and K1 =
Before stating these lemmas, we describe the third and final step in the
process by which the problem of proving the existence of a CSMEE is
reduced to one of finding a competitive equilibrium. In this step we
demonstrate how the CME can be reinterpreted as a competitive equilib-
rium in a two-good pure trade economy. In order to define this simple
economy, we first define a new "good" and let G1 denote the quantity of
this good consumed by individuals of type i. The quantity G• is assumed to
be related to the quantity C by the budget constraint
(42) = A + r(1 — C,).
Note that when (35) holds, the consumption of G, will always be nonnega-
tive. Individual i's preferences for alternative (G,, C-) bundles are repre-
sented by the "utility function"
(43) max Eu(G1 + C1
[1 +'K,J
This utility function is well defined when G satisfies (42) because of the
existence (yet to be demonstrated in lemma 3) of K,(C,) for each C,. In
this two-good economy r will be the price of "good" C while the price of
good G will be one. Each individual will begin with an endowment vector
(44) = = (A,1)
of these two goods. Note that with this endowment vector and with prices
so defined, equation (42) becomes the budget constraint faced by all
individuals. A vector ({(O,, 1,r) is a competitive equilibrium for this
economy if, for each i, (G1, maximizes V'(G,, C,) subject to (42) and
the nonnegativity constraints G,  0 and  0, and if supply equals
demand in both markets, i.e., if
(45) = 1
and
(46) p.,O1 = A.
Note that (45) is the same as (39) and that, as usual, (46) is implied by
Walras's law and by (45). Walras's law is also true for the usual reason;
i.e., it follows from the budget constraint (42).
It is now a simple matter to use the observation just made to establish in
proposition 5 the relationship between a CSMEE and the competitive
equilibrium just defined.
e
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Proposition 5. Assume that (20) holds for all (K, B), and that assump
tion Al holds. Then is a CSMEE if and only if(i) the
allocation ({(G1, C1)}7= 1,r) is a competitive equilibrium of the economy
jp1
which there are consumers with utility functions defined by (43)
every consumer has the initial endowment o defined by (44) and (ii) K.
A(C1), i.e., k, maximizes
Eu
Proposition 5 will make it possible for us to prove in theorem 1 below
that a CSMEE exists. This will be done by demonstrating the existence of
a competitive equilibrium in the economy just described. This demon
stration can be accomplished with standard arguments if the choice
(C,, G1) that maximizes V subject to (42) can be shown to be unique for
each r and to vary continuously with r. The uniqueness has already been
established by lemma 2 for the case in which u(. , i) is strictly concave. But
the existence and continuity in r of an optimizing choice have yet to be
demonstrated. The proof of existence is implied by lemmas 3 and 4,
which we now state. As mentioned earlier, lemma 3 asserts that for each
C in the interval (0,(AIr) + 1], there exists a which maximizes
F'(K, C). Lemma 4 demonstrates the existence of C value which
maximizes F(K1(C),C) = V'(A + r(1—C),C).
The proofs of these lemmas, which are given in appendix 2, use the
second differentiability of u and g. This is, in fact, the first point at which
differentiability has been used. It will be noted, however, that in stating
and proving these lemmas, u is not assumed to be strictly concave.
Lemma 3. For each r  0 and C E (0,(AIr) + 1], F'is a strictly
pseudoconcave function of K and there exists a unique K1(C1) which
maximizes F'(KI, C1) subject to K  0. Furthermore, when C, E (0, (AI
r) + 1], K.(C,) is a differentiable function of C and of r. If the individuals
of type i are risk neutral, i.e., if u(.,i) is linear, or if g(K,x) satisfies
Diamond's assumption of stochastic constant returns to scale, i.e., if X is a
subset of real numbers and
(47) g(K,x) h(K)x,
then for all C, E (0,(AIr) + 1], I(1(C,) = Kt, where Kt is the unique K
which maximizes expected output per capital unit,
(48) [l+K]
and which is the unique solution to
[1 + K]
= Fil
Finally,1
(50)
satisfied
(51)
In
(52)
howe
(53)
If, inj
type 4
(54)
In
(1
(49)
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Finally, when the investors in i are risk averse,
(50) lirnK.(C.) = K*.
Figure 5.2 uses equation (49) to describe K*. Also note that when g
satisfies (47), (49) is equivalent to
(51) h(K) — h'(K)(l + K) = 0.
In this case figure 5.2 can be reinterpreted to obtain figure 5.3.
Lemma 4. First suppose that
below
nceof (52)
Eg(K*,i)
[1+K*]
hoice if i is a risk neutral type, then = K* and can be chosen arbitrarily, if,
been
however, i is a risk averse type, then K = 0
But
Next, suppose that
tobe Eg(K*,i)
nd 4, (53) r< [1 + K*]
each
nizes If, in this case, i is a risk neutral type, then (Ks, C) = (K*,(Alr) + 1). if
vhich type i individuals are risk averse, then >0 and E, > 0.
Finally, assume that
e the Eg(K*
ihich (54) r> + K*
ating L
ictly
hich
(Al
sfies
'isa
eK
=
Fig.5.2
11
(i) the
my in
3)and
K,
In this case = E, = 0 for risk averse as well as for risk neutral types.
K+1
mdi)
the risk
for all U
(57)
ThUS,fQ
denj
If
the
case r Q
E1=Q
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(K')
h(K)
K+1
(1 + K') h'(K') = h (K')
Fig. 5.3
1 K'+l
In interpreting (52), (53), and (54) and subsequent references to these
equations and inequalities, it should be recalled that K* is the unique
operating capital level at which (49) holds.
These lemmas can now be used to prove that a equilibrium
exists in the two-commodity pure trade economy. As noted, this implies
the existence of a CSMEE.
PropositIon 6. If assumption Al is satisfied, the,i there exists a competi-
tive equilibrium ({(G,, 1,r) such that, for each i, C) maximizes
V' (G,, C.) subject to (42) and the nonnegativity constraints are such that
(45) and (46) hold. if individuals of one type, say, type 1, are risk neutral
and if
(55) > 1
,.' + 1'
then (52) holds,
=
and C, = 0 for i = 2,... ,n. If all individuals are risk averse or if
individuals of some type, say, type 1, are risk neutral but (55) fails, then
(53) holds. in the second of these two cases
(56)
Proof. The assumptions made about u and g imply that V is a con-
tinuous function. When no individuals are risk neutral, this continuity
together with the uniqueness of C, implies that C, is a continuous function
of r. Using this continuity, standard proofs of existence yield an equilib-
rium.
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If individuals of some type, say, type 1, are risk neutral, the choice
E1) may not be unique. In particular, if (52) holds, then K1 = K* and
h' (K*) can be chosen arbitrarily. This nonuniqueness causes no problem in
the risk neutral case since the linearity of u and the fact that K1(C1) = K*
for all C1 imply that V' is linear; i.e.,
Eg(K*
(57) V'(GI,CI) = G1 + [1 + K*]
Thus, for risk neutral individuals, preferences are convex and the result-
ing demand correspondence is upper semicontinuous. Again, standard
existence proofs are applicable.
If the measure of the set of risk neutral types, is sufficiently large in
the sense that (55) holds, then the equilibrium is easily exhibited. In this
case r can be equated to
=
these Lemma 4 then implies that for the risk averse types, i.e., for i = 2,. .. ,n,
nique = 0. Thus, the equilibrium condition (45) reduces to
)riUm (58) =
iplies 1.1.1
When (55) holds, = will be less than (Air) + 1, the bound
ipeti- imposed on C1 by the condition (35). Lemma 4 implies that C1 solves the
nizes maximization problem of the type 1 individuals when r satisfies (52).
t that Taken together, these remarks imply that when type I individuals are risk
Utral neutral and (55) holds,
((A +r(1 +r,0)...(A +r,0),r)
is an equilibrium if r is given by (52).
Suppose now that type 1 individuals are risk neutral but that (55) fails
or that all individuals are risk averse. We want to show first that (53)
holds, i.e., that neither (52) nor (54) holds. Lemma 4 implies immedi-
r ately that (54) is inconsistent with equilibrium, since in that case
then
(59)
i= I
so that supply cannot equal demand in the C market. The same situation
occurs (i.e., (59) also holds) if r satisfies (52) and if all individuals are risk
averse. When individuals of type 1 are the only risk neutral individuals
• ity but (55) fails, lemma 4 implies
• •on
ib
- A(60)
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if r satisfies (52). If (55) fails, then (60) implies that equation (45) must
also fail and again (52) is inconsistent with equilibrium.
When r satisfies (53), (56) follows from lemma 4. QED.
The existence of a CSMEE when (20) holds is established in the
theorem which follows. The theorem also describes the influence of
attitudes toward risk and of certain important technological assumptions
on the equilibrium allocations and on the price of capital. The theorem
follows immediately from the results obtained above. Together with the
interpretative remarks that follow, it can be viewed as a summary of the
results established up to this point.
Theorem 1. Suppose that assumption Al is satisfied and that (20) holds
for all (K,B). Then there exists a CSMEE ({(9,k,)}7,. 1,r). If all indi-
viduals are risk averse or if one type of individual, say, type 1, is risk
neutral but the number 0/risk neutral individuals is small in the sense that
(55) fails, then > 0, K,> 0, v, = > 0, r satisfies (53) and for any
Eu'(A + r[l + —
r
= Eu'(A + r[l —
-9,] + — rk1], 1)
Eu'(A + r[1 + —
= [l+K,]
Eu'(A + + —
< <
[1+K,] [l+K*]
in the latter of these two cases, we will have, in addition, K1 = K* and
(Air) + 1 numb
Y111+K*1 many
hypol
If type 1 individuals are risk neutral and there are enough individuals of mdiv
this type, in the sense that (55) holds, then rsatisfies (52), 9, = 0, K, = 0, mark
and v, = = 0 for i = 2,.. . , n while K1 = K*, that
resul
Vi [l+K*]'
V1 [1+K*] insh
toad
of tl
sup'
i>1,
(61)
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(63)
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If n
and
(64)
In
Re1
(62)
and
Thus, if there are enough risk neutral individuals, all firms maximize
expected profits and are held only by risk neutral individuals. The price of
capital is the expected marginal product of capital in this case.
L
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5) must If g satisfies Diamond's assumption of stochastic constant returns to
scale (i.e., if(47) holds), then K, = K*foralltypes i, even those which are
risk averse. In this case, (29), which expresses the equality of capital supply
in the and demand, can be reinterpreted to obtain the expression
1
nptions (63) v• = 1 + K*
vith the for the number of firms.
y of the If n = 1 (i.e., if all individuals are the same), then
1v1y1=.
11 mdi-
is risk and K1 will be determined by
zse that
1
ror any (64) Eu'(A +
K1+1
1=Eu'(A+
K1+1 [1+K1]
In this case
Eu' A + 1 gK(K1,x)
• 1<1+1r=
Eu'(A+[ 1
K1+1
* and Remarks. We are able to achieve an equilibrium because of a large-
number hypothesis. Specifically, an equilibrium exists because there are
many individuals of each type. To understand why this large-number
• hypothesis is necessary for equilibrium, note that in our model any
tals of individual will exercise his option to become an entrepreneur if the
= 0, market fails to supply him with the investment opportunity, i.e., the firm,
that he would find it optimal to create for himself as an entrepreneur. As a
result, an equilibrium must supply the optimal investment opportunity
for essentially every individual. However, because of the fixed costs, not
all individuals will be able to be entrepreneurs; some will have to be
satisfied with the investment opportunities provided for them by other
entrepreneurs. Now capitalists of type i will of course be willing to invest
in shares of firms created by type i entrepreneurs. In order to achieve an
equilibrium in the market for shares to firms of type i, it must be possible
imize to adjust the number of type i firms continuously until the supply of shares
ice of of these firms equals the demand, i.e., until equation (27) holds. If the
supply of type i shares provided by an entering or exiting firm is a
significant part of the total, variations in the number of firms do not result
in continuous variations in the supply of type i shares. When, as we
assume, there is a large number (continuum) of possible firms of any
type, each firm's supply of shares is insignificant and (27) can always be
obtained by continuous variations in the number of firms.
The contrast between the case in which (55) holds and the case when it
fails should be emphasized. When (55) holds, there is a relatively large
number of risk neutral individuals. In equilibrium, this group holds all
shares to all firms. Because all final owners of firms are risk neutral, the
firms are operated at the K level which maximizes expected profits when
r, the price of capital, equals its expected marginal product. In order to
guarantee that risk neutral investors are indifferent between capital sales
for the fixed return rand the purchase of equity shares, the price of capital
must also equal expected output per unit of capitaL When this is true, all
risk averse individuals actually prefer capital sales at r to the purchase of
equity shares. The condition (55) guarantees that when r equals expected
output per capital unit, risk neutral individuals possess enough initial
wealth to avoid a positive probability of bankruptcy when they buy all
shares to the 1/(1 + K*) firms. To understand why this is so, suppose that
these firms have no debt, so that the value of their shares is 1 + K*. At
this price the capital value of all 1/(1 + K*) shares is 1. When requals both
the expected output per capital unit and the expected marginal product of
capital, the capital value of the initial endowment (A,1) is
+ 1.
Thus, the total capital value of the endowment of the entire set of risk
neutral individuals is
(65) + 1}.
When this exceeds or equals 1, the capital value of all shares, the prob-
ability of bankruptcy is zero if all 1/(1 + K*) debtless firms are held by the
risk neutral individuals. As asserted, the case in which the expression
in (65) exceeds or equals one is exactly the case in which (55) holds.
When (55) fails, risk neutral investors do not possess enough resources
to buy all 11(1 + K*) firms. In this case, risk averse buyers must be induced
to hold shares in firms. The inducement is provided for all types when r
falls below expected output per capital unit. Thus, individuals of all types
hold shares to firms. The firms held by these risk averse individuals will
not, in general, maximize expected profits unless there is stochastic
constant returns to scale. And, in fact, there will in general be a different
type of firm, i.e., a firm with a different K level, for each type of
individual.
When r is exceeded by expected output per capital unit, risk neutral
individuals have a real preference for equity shares over capital sales at r
172 Richard E. Kihlstromliean-Jacques Laffont
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result and this preference is never eliminated until the maximum number of
as we shares are purchased. This, of course, occurs when (62) holds.
Df any Note that the extreme case in which there are no risk neutral mdi-
ays be viduals can also be interpreted as a case in which (55) fails because =
0. In the other extreme case which occurs when all individuals are risk
'hen it neutral, (55) must hold because = 1 and
+ 1>1.
ii, the When there are stochastic constant returns to scale, all firms choose to
when operate at the output level which maximizes expected profits if r equals
ler to the expected marginal product of capital. In this case r will actually equal
sales the marginal product of capital if and only if (55) holds. In other cases, r
apital will be lower than the expected marginal product of capital since, in these
le, all cases, r satisfies (61).
ise of The fact that (47) implies that individuals of all types choose to operate
ected their firms at K* is a manifestation of the results obtained by Ekern and
nitial Wilson (1974), Leland (1974), and Radner (1974). They showed that such
iy all unanimity would be achieved when a condition they called spanning was
satisfied. Stochastic constant returns to scale are a special case of span-
• At fling.
both Proof. Using (36) and (42), the equilibrium ({(G1, which was
ict of shown to exist in proposition 6 can be translated into a CSMEE. For the
cases in which (55) does and does not hold when type 1 individuals are
risk neutral and for the case in which no individuals are risk neutral, the
same equations can be used to translate, in an obvious way, the descrip-
risk tions of ({(G1, 1,r) obtained in proposition 6 into descriptions of the
CSMEE.
The results for the case in which (47) holds follow from the results
obtained for this case in lemma 3.
rob-
i Finally, the expressions for r provided by the first two equalities in (61)
the are obtained from the first-order conditions for K, and respectively.
SlOfl The first inequality in (61) follows from the fact that u' < 0, while the
Is. second inequality follows .from the definition of K*.
rces The results for the case n = 1 also follow immediately from the
ced first-order conditions. QED.
pes
will 5.5 Efficiency
stic The present section asks whether and in sense a CSMEE is
ent efficient. Again, the discussion is limited to the case in which expectations
of are classical in the sense that N = The well-known theorem that a
competitive equilibrium is efficient and the fact that a CSMEE is such an
equilibrium in a suitably defined two-good pure trade economy combine
r to imply that a CSMEE is efficient relative to the class of basic allocations
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which are representable as allocations of the two goods in this pure trade
economy. This fact will make it possible to establish that a CSMEE is partiti4
efficient in the restricted sense of the term employed by Diamond (1967).
The proof is not immediate only because there are some allocations
that are feasible in the restricted sense of Diamond which are not repre- and
sentable as feasible allocations in the two-good pure trade economy.
Unrepresentable Diamond restricted feasible allocations are those in
which individuals hold diversified portfolios not satisfying F(a, E such
0. It is easily seen, however, that, for reasons identical to those under-
lying proposition 3, allocations involving diversified portfolios can be (66)
Pareto dominated by undiversified portfolios which are representable in
the two-good pure trade economy. The formalization of this argument is and fi
the proof of theorem 2 below.
In the unrestricted sense of the term associated with Arrow and De- (67)
breu, a CSMEE is not in general efficient. This situation can Occur
because there are allocations of the basic economy which are not achiev- Ar
able as Diamond feasible allocations in the stock market economy and Intet
are also not representable in the above described two-good pure trade plan
economy. Indeed, some of these unrepresentable allocations can be ecor
shown to Pareto dominate the CSMEE. This will be done after theorem He c
2. At that point we will also give conditions under which the CSMEE is chor
unrestricted efficient. Briefly, this occurs when all individuals are alike or cont
if the set of risk neutral individuals, which we again identify with type 1
individuals, is sufficiently large to imply that (55) holds. These results will eaci
follow from an application of the marginal conditions for unrestricted avai'
efficiency, obtained in Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979). These marginal E, q
conditions can also be applied to demonstrate that when Diamond's
assumption of stochastic constant returns to scale is satisfied, all but one allo
of the manifestations of "first-best" inefficiency disappear. Specifically, rest
in this case all firms' production decisions are at efficient levels and the stat
number of firms is efficient. The allocation of risk remains inefficient K(
because the opportunities for exchanging risks in the market for firm pos
shares are not sufficiently rich.
Before stating theorem 2, it is necessary to describe the set of alloca-
tions which are feasible in the restricted sense of Diamond. Diamond
efficient allocations can then be formally discussed as the set of Diamond in
feasible allocations which are not Pareto dominated by other Diamond all
feasible allocations. The discussion of Diamond restricted feasible and of
Diamond efficient allocations is naturally preceded by some considera- I
tion of unrestricted feasibility and efficiency. Thus, we begin by defining
the set of unrestricted efficient allocations. The definitions of unrestricted
feasibility and unrestricted or "first-best" efficiency are adaptations to all
the present context of the familiar definitions of feasibility and efficiency co
applied in the Arrow-Debreu analysis of markets for contingent claims. thi
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trade Definition 2. A contingent claims allocation is a specification of a
[EE is partition {E, C} of [0, 1j and of two Lebesgue measurable functions
[967). K:E—+[0,cc)
ations
repre- and
y: [0,11 x)seln
such that
inder-
an be (66)
J
= p(C)
blein £
tent is and for eachx E X
iDe- (67) foccur 0 E
:hiev- As usual, the set of feasible allocations satisfying definition 2 can be
y and interpreted as the set of choices available to a central planner. Such a
trade planner can, by assigning individuals to their respective roles in the
in be economy, choose the set E of entrepreneurs and C, the set of capitalists.
orem He can also assign a capital allocation K(a) to each entrepreneur a in the
EE is chosen set E. Finally, he can distribute to each individual a in [0, 1] a
keor contingent claims vector (y(a,x))XEX. Of course, the allocation he
vpe 1 chooses is necessarily restricted by the limited availability of income in
swill each state x and of capital. He does, however, have some control over the
icted availability of income in state x. This control is exercised when he chooses
gmat E, C, and K(.). His choice of E and C determines the number of firms.
)nd's The amount produced by each of these firms is determined by the capital
one allocation K(.). Once these choices have been made, the availability
ally, restriction imposed on the allocation of contingent claims to wealth in
Ithe state x is the supply equal demand condition (67). The choice of E, C, and
K(.) is constrained by the availability of capital. This constraint is im-
• firm posed in the capital supply equal capital demand equation (66).
In making choices, a planner is assumed to be guided by the usual
oca- principle of efficiency which is embodied in the following definition.
ond Definition 3. A contingent claims allocation is efficient if(i) it is feasible
ond in the sense that it satisfies definition 2 and (ii) there is no other feasible
.ond allocation which Pareto dominates it, i.e., which rnakesasignificant subset
and of individuals better off while making almost no one worse off.
era- The concept of' efficiency introduced by Diamond demands less than
definition 3. Specifically, it imposes restrictions, beyond those imposed in
;ted (66) and (67) by availability, on the set of permissible contingent claims
to allocations against which a potentially Diamond efficient allocation is
compared. Of course, any Diamond efficient allocation must also satisfy
• these added restrictions. These new restrictions take the form of addi-
I
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tional constraints imposed on the relationship betweeny(a,x), individuaj
a's claim to consumption in state x, and x, the state on which y(a,x) is availati
contingent. In particular, individuals are permitted to receive income in
j (70)
two forms. First, they can be paid or pay fixed amounts not contingent on by
the random variable Second, they can receive a proportional share, alloca
fixed in advance, of the output of any existing firm. The share is fixed Ifl the fir
the sense that the proportion received from any firm is independent of x, these il
the outcome of The contingent claims allocations obtainable are the of nod
same as those achievable when the only institution for the exchange of these
risk is a stock market in which firm shares are traded for fixed payments. alloca
The imposition of these restrictions on y(a,x) has the effect of constrain- availa
ing the planner to use the same risk trading institutions as those used by
the market. If a planner cannot, using only the market institutions,
Pareto dominate a market allocation, then that allocation is Diamond satisf
efficient. A
The following definition describes the set of Diamond feasible alloca- tion
tions.
Definition 4. A contingent claims allocation is feasible in the sense of best I
Diamond if there exist two functions
F: [0, 1]—* the set of nonnegative measures on the Lebesgue IS Di
measurable subsets of E WhZC
vldu4
and
cand
such that (i) for each x E X and a E [0,1]
(68)
(ii) for each E' C E
E
(69) f F(a,E')I.L(da)=14E'), 11
and (iii)
(70)
J
f(a)da = A. of
A specification of {E, C}, K, y, F, and f satisfying (66), (68), (69), and (70)
will be referred to as a Diamond feasible allocation. (7F
Definition 4 describes the set of contingent claims allocations achiev-
able when the institutional constraints imposed by the presence of a stock
market in firm shares are added to the availability constraints of defini- In
tion 2. The added restrictions on y(a,x) are imposed by equation (68) in of
which the fixed payment received or made by a isf(ct) and his noncontin- re
gent portfolio of shares to firm output is F(a). The income availability eq
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.1' dividual restriction (67) imposed in definition 2 is replaced, in definition 4, by the
'(a,x) is availability constraint (69) of shares to firms' output and by the constraint
come in (70) on fixed payments. The number of available shares to firms operated
igenton by entrepreneurs in some subset E' of E is p.(E'). When F(s) is the
1 share, allocation of firm share portfolios, the number of outstanding shares to
fixed in the firms of the entrepreneurs in E' is the left side of (69). As (69) asserts,
of x, these must be equal in any feasible allocation. Whenf(.) is the allocation
are the of noncontingent payments, the left side of (70) represents the total of
ange of . these payments. The amount A represents the economy's total initial
iments. allocation of nonrandom income. As (70) asserts, this is the amount
available for the purpose of making nonrandom payments. Note that
ised by (68)—(70) imply (67) so that this condition does not have to be explicitly
:utions, introduced when y(a,x) satisfies (68) for each cx and when F(s) andf(')
amond satisfy (69) and (70), respectively.
A planner who is restricted to the choice of a contingent claims alloca-
afloca- tion which satisfies the stock market institutional constraints added in
definition 4 can apply the usual Pareto criteria in the modified or second-
of best sense introduced by Diamond.
Definition 5. A contingent claims allocation is Diamond efficient if(i) ii
is Diamond feasible and (ii) there is no other Diamond feasible allocation
which Pareto dominates it, i.e., which makes a significant subset of indi-
viduals better off while making almost no one worse off.
It can now be shown that a planner with Diamond efficiency as his goal
cannot make better use of market institutions than the market does on its
own, if individual price expectations are rational in the sense that N =
Nc. In interpreting the rationality of the expectations. the reader should
recall the discussion of rational expectations in section 5.3.
Theorem 2. Assume that N satisfies (20) and that assumption Al holds.
Then a competitive stock market entrepreneurial equilibrium is Diamond
efficient.
Proof. Suppose that A* = ({E*,C*}, K*, y* r is a Diamond
feasible allocation which Pareto dominates an equilibrium A = ({E, E},
K, F). By what we have shown, for each individual a of type i who is in E,
K(a) = = = 0. Similarly,eachindividual
of type i would also demand shares in firms employing K and would
also demand no shares in other firms. Thus, in particular, for every i
(71) Eu(A +P(1 —i,) +
:hiev
stock
efini- In (71), f is the equilibrium price of capital. This inequality holds because
?8)ln of proposition 3. (Strictly speaking, proposition 3 implies (71) when E* is
replaced by E and f* is replaced by some portfolio of firms which exist in
1uihty equilibrium. But the same argument as that used to establish proposition
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3 applies for any set of entrepreneurs and any portfolio. In particular
holds for E* and I'*.)
Now if A* Pareto dominates A, then for all a
(72) +f*(a),i(a))
 Eu (A + r(1 — + i(a)),
and the strict inequality must hold for a set of a's of positive J.-measure
In (72), i(a) is a's type. By combining (71) and (72), we can conclude
that, for all a,
(73) +f*(a),i(a))
 Eu (A + P11 — 5F*(a df3)] + — PK*(13)}F*(a,d13),i(a))
and that (73) hoLds with a strict inequality for a set of a's of positive
measure. Now (73) implies that, for all a,
(74) f*(a)A + P[1 - fE:1 +
and that (74) holds with a strict inequality for a set of a of positive
Thus, integrating (74) over [0, 1], we get
t,1
(75)
J J
J0 E'
Because (69) holds for all E' E, we can interchange the order of
integration in (75) to obtain
(76) f 5
= F(E*)
and
(77)
L
L =
Substituting (76) and (77) in (75) and using condition (66) that supply
equals demand in the capital market, we obtain
(78) 5
>A.
Thus, (70) and (66) cannot hold simultaneously for A*, the allocation
which Pareto dominates the equilibrium A. Thus, A must be efficient in
the sense of Diamond. QED.
Theorem 2 asserts that a planner who is restricted to using the same
institutions as the market cannot Pareto dominate the market allocation.
In this appropriate second-best sense, the market is efficient. Suppose,1•
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cular, however, that the planner is liberated from the constraints imposed by
market institutions and required only to satisfy the availability constraints
imposed in definition 2. In that case, he can choose allocations which are
not obtainable in a market restricted by the institutional constraints
(68)—(70) of definition 4. With these additional choices available the
planner can indeed improve on a market allocation chosen subject to the
institutional constraints. Thus, as will be shown below, the market alloca-
easure. tion is, in general, inefficient in the first-best sense of Arrow-Debreu. We
)flClUde will also show, however, that there are important special cases in which
the allocation achieved in a stock market for firm shares is efficient in the
"first-best" sense. In these cases, the stock market institutional con-
straints are not binding. Their relaxation is therefore of no value to a
planner. In this case, the enlarged class of feasible allocations satisfying
ositive only the availability constraints of definition 2 cannot improve on a
market allocation satisfying the more stringent institutional constraints of
definition 4.
As an introduction to the discussion of "first-best" efficiency, we recall,
in the following proposition, the results obtained in Kihlstrom and Laf-
)Sitive font (1979).
Proposition 7. If ({E, C}, K(s) ,y(,')) is efficient in the sense of defini-
tion 3, then
•
79\ u'(y(a,x),a) = u'(y(13,x),13)
u'(y(a,x'),a) u'(y(13,x'), 13)
er f
for almost all a and 13 in [0,1] and for alix and x' in X. Furthermore, for
0
almost all a and 3 in E,
(80) K(a) = K(13) = K°,
where K° is determined by
(81) 1] =
for almost any a. Conversely, if an allocation satisfies (79), (80), and (81),
it is efficient in the sense of definition 3.
• Dply The proof of this proposition is contained in Kihistrom and Laffont
(1979). It will not be reproduced here. We will, however, discuss the
intuition underlying these results as well as their interpretation. The
derivation of these conditions clearly requires the differentiability
assumed throughout this paper. For the proof that (79)—(81) are sufficient
ion for efficiency, the assumptions that u and g are concave are also required.
tin It is well known that in any "first-best" efficient allocation of contin-
gent claims, individual marginal rates of substitution must be equated.
4me Condition (79) is simply an expression of this familiar condition.
The equality of the capital allocation received by each firm expressed in
(80) is a less familiar condition. It is closely related to the individual
I .__
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nondiversification result obtained in proposition 3. It asserts that, for the tal
economy, as for any individual, there are no gains to d
Economy-wide and individual nondiversification are optimal for the these [1 '.
same two reasons: the concavity of the production function in K and the
e resentfact that is the same random variable for all firms. When these tw0
conditions hold, all of the vectors of state-contingent output achievable
through diversification across a number of firms can be dominated by capital
some state-contingent output vector obtained by having these same firms expected
produce at a common level. In effect, the possibility of replicating the Equa
concave technology makes diversification unnecessary. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that two firms a and 13 did receive different capital allocations (85)
K(a) K(13). The total output of the two firms could be increased in all
states x if they each received ½[K(a) + K(13)]. This is possible because which, %i
the strict concavity of g implies that, for all x,
2g(½[K(a) + KQ3)],x)>g(K(a),x) + g(K(13),x). (86) E
This improvement would not be possible, however, if the x value in a's The ex
production function were ever different from the x value in 13's produc-
be remarked that the K° which solves (81) is independent of a equals
because (79) holds for all a and 13. It is this independence which permits left sid.
economy-wide nondiversification to be optimal, i.e., which permits all additto'
firms to produce at the same capital level in an efficient allocation.
Since each firm is operated at K°, the capital supply equal capital
demand condition implies that the total number of firms created when SIOflS
each employs [1 + K°] total capital units is efficie
tive U
(82) v0[i K interp4+ 0 opera9
Thus, (82) can be interpreted as an equation which determines v°, the The
number of firms. In fact, (82) can be inverted to obtain
(83)
When (83) is substituted in (81), the result is is the
prene
(84) — = — sides
V V V tionali
which is the same as equation (39) in Kihistrom and Laffont (1979). Frq
Equation (84) directly determines v0. unresl
For the purpose of interpreting (81) and (84), we can follow common
practice and use = to measure the income hold.1
value of capital in statex. The 1] = (1/v°) gK((lIv°) tO
— 1,x) then becomes the income value, in state x, of the [1 + K°] = 1/v0 operj
I
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total capital units required to operate a firm at K°. The left sides of (81)
and (84) can therefore be interpreted as the expected marginal utility of
these [1 + K°] = 1/v0 capital units. The right sides of (81) and (84)
represent the expected marginal utility of the output produced by a firm
operated at K°. Thus, (81) and (84) assert that new firms are created up to
the point at which the expected marginal utility of the income value of the
capital used to create a new firm and operate it at K° is just equated to the
expected marginal utility of output produced by the firm.
Equation (81) can also be rewritten to obtain the equation
g(K°
(85) = [1 + K°]'
which, using (82) and (83), is, in turn, equivalent to
(86) — 1,1) = — 1,i)v°.
The expressions in (85) and (86) assert that capital is efficiently divided
between its alternative uses as an operating and entrepreneurial input
when the expected marginal utility of the marginal product of capital
equals the expected marginal utility of the output unit of capital. The
left sides of (85) and (86) clearly measure the marginal utility of an
additional unit of operating capital. It will now be argued that the right
sides of (85) and (86) measure the marginal utility of an additional unit of
entrepreneurial capital. Then (85) and (86) can be interpreted as expres-
sions of a conventional wisdom; viz., an input, in this case capital, is
efficiently allocated when it yields the same marginal utility in all alterna-
tive uses, in this case as entrepreneurial and as operating capital. To
interpret the right sides of (85) and (86), note that when one new firm
operating at K° is created, it produces g(K°,x) income units in state x.
The proportion of entrepreneurial to total capital used to obtain this
output is 1/(1 + K°). Thus,
[1
is the share of additional output attributable to the one unit of entre-
preneurial capital used to create the As a consequence, the right
sides of (85) and (86) measure the expected marginal utility of an addi-
tional unit of entrepreneurial capital.
From proposition 7 it is clear why a CSMEE is inefficient in the
unrestricted Arrow-Debreu sense. First, there is no mechanism to
guarantee that risk is efficiently allocated. Thus, in general, (79) fails to
hold. In addition, there is, in the general case, a misallocation of capital
to firms. This occurs because entrepreneurs of different types choose to
operate their firms at different K levels. Since K, is, except in special
r
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1,1
circumstances, different from when i j, the equality required by (80) The
fails to hold. second•
Note that in spite of the fact that (79) and (80) fail to hold in a CSMEE tion ta
equation (61) implies that (81) does hold for all i. As noted, however, the The
K at which (81) is satisfied is different for each i. This can happen because points
risk is misallocated and (79) fails. The fact that K is different for different technol
types makes it impossible to relate the number of firms to the firms' to scale
capital demand by a simple equation such as (83). Thus, the efficient the
number of firms can no longer be deduced from (84), which was obtained
from (81) and (83). stochasi
Although a CSMEE is not, in general, efficient in the first-best sense, this
there are special circumstances of some importance in which first-best we do,
efficiency is achieved. The proposition which follows describes these will
cases, same a
Proposition 8. Assume that N = Nc. If individuals of one type, say, type
1, are risk neutral and their number is sufficiently large to imply that (55) isfied
holds, then the equilibrium is efficient in the sense of definition 3. The tion
equilibrium is also efficient in this sense if all individuals are alike. problei
Proof. When type 1 individuals are risk neutral aRd (55) holds, (1974)
theorem 1 asserts that all firms are completely owned by risk neutral mousl
individuals. Risk averse individuals receive the sure return r for their stockl
capital. Thus, all risks are borne by the risk neutral individuals, as they We r
must be if (79) is to hold in this case. Since all firms are operated at K*,
the K level which maximizes expected profits, (80) holds and capital is
efficiently allocated across firms. With risk neutral individuals, (81) re- ket
duces to (49), which is the equation defining K*. Thus, the equilibrium scale.
K, K*, is the efficient level at which to operate each firm and the made1
equilibrium number of firms 1/(1 + K*) is also the efficient number.
The proof that the equilibrium is efficient when there is only one type
also follows from the marginal conditions derived in proposition 7 and
from the properties of the equilibrium established for this case in theorem tion
1. Again, the important fact is that all firms are operated at the same level
K1. Because of (61), this is the K level which satisfies (81). The equality of
marginal rates of substitution required in (79) is a consequence of the fact defin'
that all individuals are identical and hold identical portfolios. QED. the e
of
5.6 Relationship of a CSMEE to the Diamond Equilibrium stoch
and Long-Run Competitive Equilibrium thant
without Uncertainty
The objective of this brief section is to argue that the equilibrium tion
concept proposed in this paper can be viewed as a generalization of two of
important concepts of economic equilibrium. reqi
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The first of these concepts is Diamond's stock market equilibrium. The
second is the classical long-run competitive equilibrium in which produc-
tion takes place at minimum average cost.
The present model can be related to Diamond's from either of two
points of view which differ in their interpretation of the production
technology and of Diamond's assumption of stochastic constant returns
to scale. The first of these interpretations to be considered is
the one implicitly adopted throughout our exposition. Thus, we first
identify the technology with the production function g and interpret
stochastic constant returns to scale to mean that g(K,x) = h(K)x. Using
this interpretation and making appropriate adjustments for the fact that
we do, but Diamond did not, consider the case of free entry and exit, we
will now argue that the stock market equilibrium considered here is the
same as that considered by Diamond. Diamond's discussion of this
equilibrium concept is limited to the case in which the technology sat-
isfied the assumption of stochastic constant returns to scale. This restric-
tion was necessary to• simplify the study of the firm's maximization
problem. As Leland (1974), Ekern and Wilson (1974), and Radner
(1974) have shown, this assumption implies that ,stockholders unani-
mously agree on the choice criterion to be used by the firm. In fact, all
stockholders agree that the firm should maximize its stock market value.
We replace this criterion for firm maximization by the assumption of
entrepreneurial expected utility maximization. Because of the unanimity
results just mentioned, expected utility maximization implies stock mar-
ket value maximization when there are stochastic constant returns to
scale; In the present paper, unanimity is manifested in the observation
made in the statement of theorem 1 that, when there are stochastic
constant returns to scale, all firms produce at K*, where K* satisfies (51).
Thus, the capital level chosen by all firms in a CSMEE is the same as that
chosen in a Diamond equilibrium, whenever Diamond's firm maximiza-
tion criterion is applicable, i.e., whenever there are stochastic constant
returns to scale. Diamond showed that his equilibrium was efficient in a
sense consistent with definition 5. His concept of efficiency differed from
definition 5 because he did not explicitly consider firm entry and exit or
the efficient number of firms. Theorem 2 generalizes this efficiency result
of Diamond to the class of technologies g not satisfying stochastic con-
stant returns to scale but in which free entry is permitted. In the case of
stochastic constant returns to scale, we obtain a somewhat stronger result
than simply efficiency in the sense of definition 5. Specifically, the
• observation that all firms produce at K* implies that the CSMEE a/loca-
tion of capital is the same in all respects as the first-best efficient allocation
of capital. Since all firms produce at the same K level, the equality (80)
required for first-best efficiency is satisfied. This implies that the distribu-
S
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tion of capital across firms is efficient. In order to prove that the efficient
K level at which all firms should produce is K * and that the efficient
number of firms is 1/(1 + K*), we note that (81) implies (51) when
g
satisfies (47). In spite of the fact that capital is efficiently allocated, the
allocation of risk remains inefficient in the Arrow-Debreu sense because
(79) fails to hold.
By interpreting the technology differently, we can reveal the features
of our model which permit the generalization of Diamond's result. Spe-
cifically, there is a sense in which the technology studied here exhibits not
only stochastic constant returns to scale, but constant returns to scale.
This property is introduced by our assumption that the technology de-
scribed by g can be replicated without limit at a cost of one unit of capital
per replication. From this point of view, the technology is more accu-
rately represented by the production set
(87)
J
[1 + : us a nonnegative measure on the
0
Lebesgue measurable subsets of with
f
Since this production set is a cone, it exhibits constant returns to scale
and a fortiori stochastic constant returns to scale in a sense which is
slightly more general than that considered by Diamond. The added
generality arises because Diamond's production sets are one-dimensional
cones.
It should be emphasized that it is precisely the replication possibilities
embodied in the free entry assumption which imply the linearity of the
production set and thereby lead to the fulfillment of the stochastic con-
stant returns to scale hypothesis.
From this point of view, theorem 2 could be viewed as an extension of
Diamond's results to the more general linear technology sets described by
(87).
When there is no uncertainty, a CSMEE is the same as a long-run
perfectly competitive equilibrium in which entry forces price to equal
minimum average cost. To see this, we can view the case of no uncer-
tainty as a special case in which (47) holds with x = 1. In this case, a
CSMEE is again characterized by the fact that K = K* for all firms. As
before, K* is determined by (51) and is as shown in figure 5.3. Fur-
thermore, for any r, K* is the K level which minimizes the average cost
(r(1 + K)Ih(K)).
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efficient 5,7 CSMEE When N Nc
efficient As mentioned earlier, there may exist CSMEE for expectation func-
when g tions N different from Nc. If so, there should, in fact, be a profusion of
the such equilibria. Suppose, for example, that we choose an arbitrary K.
because Assume now that, for any B,N(KB) = Nc(K,B) but that N(K,B) <
Nc(K, B) if K K. We can then find an 7 and (i,.
. .
,-9,,) such that, for
features every i, maximizes
ut. Spe- — —
ibits not Eu(A +7[1 — + K)] +
o scale, and such that
ogy de.
F capital = = 1 —.
eaccu- 1=1 1+K
The problem of finding such an equilibrium is simply one of finding a
competitive market equilibrium when there is one sure asset and one
I risky asset with return vector (g(K,x1),. . . ,g(K,xs)). Every investor has
1/(1 + K) initial shares in the risky asset and A units of the sure asset. If
N(K, B) is sufficiently small relative to Nc(K, B) when K K, it may be
possible to interpret this asset market equilibrium a CSMEE with the
given N function. In this CSMEE, the only firms ever created will be
those employing K units of operating capital. Because N(K,B) =
Nc(K,B), every individual will be indifferent between remaining a capi-
talist and creating a firm operating at K.
o scale To demonstrate that we have in fact a CSMEE, it remains to be shown
hich is that it is not to any agent's advantage to set up a firm (or several firms)
added with K K and hold them completely. We conjecture that a way of
isional constructing an equilibrium with this property is to take K close to a K
level obtained in a CSMEE with N = Nc. Then, the equilibrium interest
)ilities rate 7 should be close to r, the interest rate associated with the CSMEE,
"of the with N and we can be assured, by taking K close enough to K, of
c con- obtaining a utility level for i which is higher than what i can obtain by
himself.
ion of Finally, it is worth noting that there is no guarantee that a CSMEE with
'ed by nonclassical expectations is Pareto superior to the equilibrium obtained
without a stock market (Kihlstrom and Laffont 1979).
.g-run
equal 5.8 Fixed Costs, Uncertainty, and the Need for a Stock Market
.ncer-
use, a In this section we will argue, using the present model, that the necessity
As for a stock market arises from the existence of the fixed costs incurred in
Fur- setting up a firm and from the presence of uncertainty. As mentioned in
cost the introduction, the fact that the stock market plays a nontrivial rote in
the economy studie.d here follows from a comparison of the equilibrium
of the stock market economy with the equilibrium of the same economy
without a stock market. In Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), we studied the
equilibrium achieved in the non—stock market economy. That
rium differs in several ways from the one achieved with a stock market.
First, without a stock market, some individuals strictly prefer to be
capitalists rather than entrepreneurs while others strictly prefer to be
entrepreneurs. In Contrast, in the stock market model of this paper, all
individuals are indifferent about their role as entrepreneurs or nonen.
trepreneurS. This is true because without a stock market only entre.
preneurS bear the risks associated with the firms they create. Nonentre.
preneurs bear no risks. As a result of the lack of risk sharing opportuni.
ties, the marginal condition (61) does not hold in the non—stock market
economy. Furthermore, in contrast to the stock market economy in
which N = the non—stock market economy is inefficient in Di-
amond's second-best sense. If, in addition, there is only one type of
individual, a stock market equilibrium in which N = is efficient in the
unrestricted sense while the non—stock market equilibrium is not. These
observations imply that the introduction of the stock market plays an
essential role in improving the efficiency of the economy's operation.' As
we shall now show, this is not true if there is neither uncertainty nor a
fixed cost to setting up a firm.
In the model discussed above, the fixed cost is borne in the form of the
one unit of entrepreneurial capital required to create a firm. In general,
we could have assumed that the fixed cost was c units of capital, where c
1. In order to extend the analysis to this trivially different case, it would
of course be necessary to assume that there exists a K(x) at which
(88) g(K(x),x) = [K(x) + c].
Thus, figure 5.1 would be replaced by figure 5.4.
In this case Nc(K,B) would, of course, equal K + c — B.
If c = 0, the assumption that a K(x) exists which satisfies (88) implies
that g(K,x) = Kx. Thus, g not only must exhibit stochastic constant
returns to scale, but must, in fact, be a constant returns to scale function.
In this case figure 5.4 becomes figure 5.5, and K(x) is not unique. As a
result, the equilibrium K* will not be unique. There will also be no need
for a stock market in which to sell firm shares. This is true since any
(-i,, K1) choice which is optimal for i will be indifferent to some other
choice (i,, with = 1 and = -91k1. Specifically, i's state x wealth
from K.) is A + r[1 + + and this equals A + r[1 + +
K1x if K = 91K1.
When = 1, the stock market is unnecessary. Every individual can
simply create his own firm and hold it. This is feasible since there are no
fixed costs to setting up the firm. This point has also been made in the
context of a sharecropping model by Stiglitz (1974) and Newbery (1977).
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With c > 0 and N(K, B) = K + c — B, will in general differ from
one. Because fixed costs are positive, it is not feasible for every investor
to set up his own firm. Thus, the stock market is essential for the exchange
of shares between entrepreneurs and capitalists, i.e., between those who
do not create firms but who want to hold firm shares.
It should also be added that the need for a stock market is eliminated
when there is no uncertainty. This is true even if there are fixed costs, i.e.,
even if c is positive.
Without stock trading, 1/(1 + K*) individuals create firms and raise all
operating capital by issuing debt. Their profits are
h(K*) h(K*)
The remaining K *1(1 + K*) capitalists each receive their marginal
product h#(K*) = r by selling their capital in the debt market. Thus,
without a stock market all capitalists and all entrepreneurs have a final
wealth which equals A + r.
This same result can also be obtained with a stock market, but it cannot
be improved on. If there were a stock exchange in which some individual
sold (1 —
-y) capital units in the debt market while investing -y units in firm
shares, his return would be
As noted, this is the same wealth he would obtain as an entrepreneur or as
a capitalist when there is no stock market.
The need for a stock market is also eliminated if all type 1 individuals
are risk neutral and if there are sufficiently many of these individuals to
result in the satisfaction of (55). For the stock market to be superfluous in
this case, however, it may be necessary to assume that risk neutral
S
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individuals can set up more than one firm by buying the entrepreneurial and
capital in the debt market. If this is possible, the argument just given for hold fij
the case of no uncertainty can be modified by replacing h(K) with K*.?
With this modification it can be shown that all risk neutral
individuals can receive an expected wealth of A + r by becoming entre- tributi
preneurs (possibly for more than one firm) and retaining all firm shares or (19791
by being capitalists. It can also be shown that all risk averse individuals
receive a sure wealth of A + r by remaining capitalists and holding no literal
shares. Again, the introduction of a stock market fails to permit an (197
improvement on this allocation of final wealth. H
In Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), entrepreneurs cannot set up more the
than one firm by buying entrepreneurial capital in the debt market. Thus,
in the equilibrium of that paper it is possible that not all firms are held by
the risk neutral individuals even though (55) holds.
retu,9
5.9 Survey of Related Literature ei
The survey of this section describes the post-Diamond literature and This
relates it to the present paper. We first consider the literature on the basi
possibility of stockholder unanimity. expi
As mentioned in the introduction, Leland (1974) used Diamond's whi
framework to show that the production plan which maximizes stock
market value receives unanimous shareholder approval. The same result
was obtained for a slightly broader class of technologies—specifically,
those which satisfy a condition referred to as spanning—by Ekern and maij
Wilson (1974) and Radner (1974). Grossman and Stiglitz (1977) subse- ficul
quently clarified the role of the competitivity assumption in the discussion OW!)
of unanimity. deck
Hart (1979) has shown that even without spanning, unanimous agree- COS
ment on market value maximization can be achieved in economies with a of i
S
g(Kx) Kx
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large number of firms. A similar result obtains in our model. Even if the
production function does not satisfy a spanning condition, all equilibrium
shareholders of every firm are unanimous about the goals of the firm.
This unanimity is achieved because of the clientele effect described in
proposition 4. This effect arises because of a process of market self-
selection that results in firms each of which are held by identical stock-
holders who therefore agree completely on the firm's operation. Except
in special cases, which, of course, include spanning and stochastic con-
stant returns to scale, there is not, however, unanimity across firms. This
happens because firms held by individuals of different types, in general,
choose different operating capital levels. One case, not mentioned ear-
lier, in which there is always unanimity across firms occurs when the
utility functions of all agents are from a class for which portfolio separa-
tion holds. If, for example, the utility functions u(',i) are all risk averse
and all exhibit constant absolute risk aversion, then they will all choose to
hold firms operated at the same K level which will in general differ from
K*.z
The post-Diamond stock market literature on efficiency includes con-
tributions by Hart (1975, 1977, 1979), Drèze Grossman and Hart
(1979), Helpman and Razin (1978), Stiglitz (1972, 1975), Jensen and
Long (1972), and Merton and Subrahmanyam (1974). In addition, the
literature on sharecropping contains the closely related work of Stiglitz
(1974) and Newbery (1977) discussed in section 5.8.
• Hart (1975) showed that Diamond's results could not be extended to
the case in which there were several goods traded in spot markets which
opened after the resolution of uncertainty.
• Drèze (1974) proposed a criterion for firm behavior which was imple-
mentable even when the technology failed to satisfy stochastic constant
returns to scale. Drèze's approach was suggested by his observation that
the firm's choices of production plans are, in general, public goods for the
shareholders. Firms, in effect, choose the assets available to investors.
This observation had been made earlier by Smith (1970) and is also the
basis for a later contribution by Helpman and Razin (1978). Drèze
exploited the public good interpretation by defining an equilibrium in
which the firm used the stockholder's "Lindahl prices" to compute a
• value of each production decision. It is this value which he assumed the
firm maximized, taking the distribution of ownership as given. He
observed a nonconvexity in the consumption space implied by the stock
market model. Drèze's criterion for firm maximization avoided the dif-
ficulties usually created by nonconvexities precisely because firms treated
ownership shares parametrically and because investors took production
decisions as given when choosing a portfolio of ownership shares. The
cost of decentralized decision making in Drèze's model is the possibility
of inefficient equilibria.
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The justification for Drèze's approach varies. Gevers (1974) provides a Sticki
rationale based on majority voting without side-payments. Grossman
and Hart (1979) give an argument in favor of a closely related criterion, ipation
Their argument is in the spirit of Hart's earlier paper (1977) and is based made eli
on the possibility of a takeover. equilibti
One important point to be observed is that the public good externality There
observed by Drèze fails to arise when there are stochastic constant uses a s
returns to scale. In this case, the firms have no control over the assets Two ci
which will be available to investors. An alternative method by which
constrained efficiency can be restored is to devise a framework in which partiallyl
the separation of production and investment decisions is eliminated, i.e., tainty
is internalized. In our model each individual can, Let
if he finds it necessary, jointly make the production and investment
decisions by becoming an entrepreneur. As pointed out earlier, not all the firm
individuals find it necessary to exercise this option in our equilibrium. For (1972)
any given individual, there are many individuals who become entre- jnefficit
preneurs and run firms in accordance with the given individual's desires, firms w
There is a potential problem which must be faced in any attempt to rnent
coordinate production and investment decisions. Specificaliy, such coor- be mv
dination reintroduces the nonconvexity Drèze avoided by decentraliza- tainty i
tion. In our model, this nonconvexity enters in the objective function of the eq
entrepreneurs. Fortunately, the problem created by this nonconvexity is goes t
not fundamental. This is demonstrated in our lemma 2, which establishes floncO
the uniqueness of the solution to the entrepreneurs' maximization petitiv
problem. (1967)
Hart (1977) shows that the inefficient Drèze equilibria can be elimi- Mei
nated in large economies by permitting takeovers. A situation qualifies as tion r
a takeover bid equilibrium if it is a Drèze equilibrium for which no to all'
takeover is possible. In Hart's model, the agent who takes over internal- Allow
izes the externality by buying the firm, reorganizing production, and mode
selling shares. This agent plays the role of our entrepreneur. The possibil- numb
ity of a takeover becomes a force which results in efficiency. In our and P
model, this force is provided by the possibility of entry. consi'
Helpman and Razin (1978) suppress the separation of decisions by
setting up a (participation) noncooperative game in which each agent litz ic
contributes ashare of input. However, in this game the contribution of an does I
agent creates an externality of the atmosphere type (since the production from
depends on the sum of individual inputs). Then a uniform subsidy on the into q
input contribution activity financed by lump sum transfers helps restore yam li
efficiency. However, there seems to be no reason why an agent should
take the value of the firm (i.e., here the value of future outputs) as tive 14
independent of his actions (since he provides inputs); a large-number that
assumption seems to be required to justify this "competitive" behavior, well
A Competitive Entrepreneurial Model of a Stock Market
Sticking to the public good analogy, Hart's takeover bid equilibrium is
analogous to a Foley politico-equilibrium, Helpman and Razin's partic-
ipation equilibrium is analogous to an equilibrium with subscription
made efficient by an appropriate tax system, and our entrepreneurial
equilibrium is similar to a Tiebout equilibrium.
There exists, in financial economics, a closely related literature which
uses a special model, the mean-variance model.
Two cases must be distinguished, the case of independently distributed
production functions where a general technology is used and the case of
partially correlated returns where the assumption of multiplicative uncer-
tainty is made.
Let us first consider the case where some correlation exists. The
mean-variance model permits the derivation of the equilibrium value of
the firm as a function of its investment policy. Using such a model, Stiglitz
(1972) showed that the stock market equilibrium was inefficient. The
inefficiency can be attributed to noncompetitive behavior on the part of
firms which take into account the nonproportional effect of their invest-
ment policy on their equilibrium value. The externality argument cannot
be invoked here to explain the inefficiency since piultiplicative uncer-
tainty is assumed. Jensen and Long (1972) have shown that in this model
the equilibrium converges to a Pareto optimum as the number of firms
goes to infinity. Indeed, as the number of firms goes to infinity, the
noncompetitive value maximization behavior is transformed into com-
petitive behavior, so that in the limit we are in a special case of Diamond
(1967).
Merton and Subrahmanyam (1974) have argued that perfect competi-
tion requires perfect correlation since all technologies should be available
to all individuals. It is also the point of view we have taken in this paper.
Allowing free entry at a zero cost, they show that Jensen and Long's
model (with noncompetitive behavior) is unstable with respect to the
number of firms. Free entry is shown to lead to an infinite number of firms
and Pareto optimality. The case of positive set up costs was subsequently
considered by Stiglitz (1975).
There remains the case of completely independent firms. Without (Stig-
litz 1972) or with (Jensen and Long 1972) multiplicative uncertainty, one
does not obtain efficiency in the limit. This shows that the difficulty comes
from the fact that in this case noncompetitive behavior is not transformed
into competitive behavior in the limit. In fact, Merton and Subrahman-
yam have argued that with free entry the limit of these noncompetitive
equilibria does not even exist. They also considered the case of competi-
tive behavior and multiplicative uncertainty. In this case, they showed
that the economy was Diamond efficient in the small-numbers case as
well as in the limit. This result is to be expected from Diamond's analysis.
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Finally, we mention the paper of Novshek and Sonnenschein (1978)
who consider a model without uncertainty but with free entry, fixed COStS
and noncompetitive behavior. They show that when fixed costs are small
relative to demand and when demand curves slope down, the noncom.
petitive Cournot equilibrium exists and approximates the perfectly corn..
petitive equilibrium in which price equals minimum average cost. Thus,
when there is no uncertainty, the Novshek-Sonnenschein equilibrium will
approximate the equilibrium described in this paper if the demand curves
slope down.
Appendix 1
The proof of proposition 2 is based on the two simple lemmas which
follow.
LemmaAl. Ifa K Eanda' E C, ifu(,a) = u(',a'),and if (18) holds,
then (17) holds. If a and a' are in E, if u(., a) = u(., a'), and if(19) holds,
then for some k,
(Al) k = N(K(a),B(a)) + B(a) — K(a) = N(K(a'),B(a'))
+ B(a') — K(a').
Proof. Consider first the case in which a E E and a' K C. The equilib-
rium choice, call it (K(a),B(ct)), is a's maximizing choice for these
values. Once (K(a), B(a)) is fixed at these values, the equilibrium ['(a) is
chosen to solve
and
max Eu( WE(k(a), E(a), ['(a)), a)
1(a)
(A2) max EU(WE( k(a) , ['(a)), a)
I (a)
If now
= maxEu(wE(K(a),B(a),F(a)),a).
1(a)
K(a)
B(ct)
(A3) A(a)) <1 + —
then
(A4) max Eu (WE(R(a), E(a),F(a)),a) <max Eu(Wc (['(a')), a').
1(a) 1(a)
This is so as a result of two facts. First, each portfolio that a is able to
choose can also be chosen by a'. Second, for each portfolio ['(a), (A3)
will imply that
193—1'
with
As a col
which q
['(a',{c4
(A5)
a'. If
si
the ii
Pr
separ
For
Al at
type!
If
1
cortta
type
4.
I
•1
S
193 A Competitive Entrepreneurial Model of a Stock Market
.978), WE(R(a),E(a),F(ct))< Wc(['(a))
COStS, with probability one. Taken together (A2) and (A4) assert that (18) fails.
small As a consequence (18) implies
icom-
com- N(K(a), B(a)) 1 + K(cx) — B(a),
rhus, which together with proposition 1 implies (17). A similar argument
rnwill establishes (Al). QED.
urves LemmaA2. Supposethatu(•,ct) = u(.,a'). If a' E Canda E Eandif
['(ct' ,{a}) = 0, then (18) holds. If a and a' are in E and ['(a' ,{a}) = 0, then
(A5) max B(a'), ['(a')), a')
[(a)
K(c,')
B(a')
which  max Eu(WE(K(a) , B(a), ['(a)), a).[(a)
K(cx)
zolds, B(a)
zolds, Proof. If ['(a' ,{a}) = 0, then a's firm is not significant in the portfolio of
a'. If the right side of (18) was exceeded by the left, a would prefer to
switch his role from entrepreneur to capitalist. Since his firm is not
significant in ['(a'), he can imitate a' and purchase this portfolio. This
would yield him a higher utility than he has in the equilibrium. But then
uilib- the equilibrium condition (12) must fail for a, a contradiction. This
these contradiction implies that the right side of (18) must exceed or equal the
(a) is left side. The opposite inequality is obtained by a similar argument as is
the inequality (A5). QED.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof proceeds by treating each type i
separately. We first consider those types in which there are capitalists.
For such a type, we choose a specific capitalist a' and consider the set
= {a: a is an entrepreneur of type i and ['(a' ,{a}) > O},
which is the set of entrepreneurs of type i in whose firms a' makes a
significant investment. This set is of Lebesgue measure zero. Thus, for
almost all entrepreneurs of type i, ['(a' ,{a}) = 0. Because of this, lemmas
Al and A2 imply that (17) and (18) hold for almost all entrepreneurs of
type i.
If there are capitalists of every type, the proof is completed by the
above argument. Suppose, however, that there is some type i which
contains no capitalists. If we choose an arbitrary entrepreneur a' of this
type, it will again be true that = 0. Thus, again ['(a',{a}) = 0
except for a set of type i entrepreneurs of measure zero. Since a' was
chosen arbitrarily, lemma A2 implies that for any a' of type i, (A5) holds
to for almost all entrepreneurs a of type i. But this can only happen if (19)
(A3) holds for almost all a and a' of type i. Thus, almost all entrepreneurs of
type
i must have the same expected utility in equilibrium. Then because
•1
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of lemma Al there must be a k such that (Al) holds for almost all a and
of type i.
It now remains to be shown that k = 1. To accomplish this, we will
show that if k < 1, then almost any entrepreneur of type i can raise his
extended utility over that which he obtains in equilibrium by becoming a
capitalist. The only problem that may arise in this argument is that by
becoming capitalists and eliminating their firms, the type i entrepreneurs
might lose significant investment opportunities.
To see how this possibility can be avoided, we must again choose some
representative type i entrepreneur a'. He can be chosen so that (19) and
(Al) hold for almost all other a of type i. As before, r(a' ,{a}) = 0 for
almost all type i entrepreneurs a. Thus, almost any type i entrepreneur a
can still buy the portfolio F(a') after exiting as an entrepreneur. If a does
exit to become a capitalist and does buy ['(a'), 'his random income will be
A + r[l —fN(K(I3),BU3))['(a',d13)] +
With probability one this will exceed, by 1 — k, the random equilibrium
income of a', which is
A + r[k — fN(K(13),B(13))F(a',d13)] +
Thus, by becoming a capitalist and buying ['(a'), almost every entre-
preneur a of type i can obtain a higher expected utility than a' does. But
recall that the equilibrium expected utility of a' is equal to that of almost
all entrepreneurs a of type i. Thus, when k < 1, almost all entrepreneurs
of type i will prefer to be capitalists rather than entrepreneurs. Thus, k <
I is not consistent with equilibrium. QED.
195 A,
1'
where
Also,
(A8)
if Fk1(K)
holds
there ex
then
We
0,
(A9)
Now uli
By
Thus
In addi
(AlO)
for all
Thus,
at whl
If t4'
Appendix 2
Proof of Lemma 3. Note first that
(A6) = Eu'(7 i) — g(K1, 1(1+J(,) (1+K,)2
and
(A7) = Eu"(7,i) —
J2
(1 + K,) (1 + K,)2
+
—
+ 2
(1 + K,) (1 + K,)2 (1 + K.)3
4 -'I-'
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and a' where
g(K1
vewill t=A+r[l_CiJ+Cil+K.
.ise his
ming a Also, notice that (A6) and (A7) imply that
hatby 2gK.(K1 x) g(K, x)
eneurs (A8) = Eu"(t ,i)
(1 + K,) — (1 + K,)2
gK.K.(K,x)
9)and +Eu'(t,i) ' ' <0,
:Ofor (1+K,)
neur jf Fk.(K,, C,) = 0. Since < 0 for all x x, the strict inequality in (A8)
cx does holds even if type i individuals are risk neutral and u"(',i) = 0. Thus, if
vill be there exists K,(C1) such that
!p).
then K,(C1) must be a unique global maximizer of C,).
ibrium We now prove that for each C, and r, there exists a K, satisfying Fk, =
0, which, because of (A6), is equivalent to
(A9) +K1) —g(K,,i)] =0.
Now under our assumptions
entre-
. —.
. .=Oifx=x
meurs
By continuity, there exists a JC>O such that K K implies
s,k <
gK(K,x)[l + K] — g(K,x)>0 if x x.
Thus K, K implies
+ K.]
In addition, there exists a such that K,  R implies that
(AlO) gK1(K1,x)[1 + IC.] —g(K,,x)<0
for all x x. If x = x, the difference on the left side of (A 10) is zero.
Thus, K  implies
(All) Eu'(I,i) + K,) — <0.
Now the continuity of u and g implies that there exists K1(C1) E K)
at which (A9) holds and F'(K,(C,),C1) = 0. Implicit function theorem
arguments guarantee that K,(C,) is a differentiable function of C. and r.
If u(., i) is linear, u'(t, i) is independent of the value t taken by t . Thus,
(A9) reduces to (49). If (47) holds, (A9) becomes
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(A12) Eu'(t,i)[h'(K,)(l + K1) — Now
which is zero when (51) holds. As noted in the text, (51) and (49) are
(52)
equivalent when g satisfies (47).
To prove that (A14)
(A13) tim = K*,
Since u
recall that K,(C1) must be in the interval [K, If (A13) fails, there will for the
be a sequence {Cr} converging to zero such that
K**
i.e.,
where K and C,
tim FK,(Ki(Ci),Ci)=FK.(K**,0)
(1
+K**)U (A 0. it will
and K
But for each m, Fin
= 0,
so that
= 0. BecaJ
As a result of this contradiction, (A13) must hold. QED.
Proof of Lemma 4. We consider the risk neutral case first. In this case,
lemma 3 and (52) imply For
* * therg(K x) g(K x)
F'(K1(C,),C,)= E[A +E
(1 +K*)(1
— C,)+ C
(1 + K*)I
=A+E(lK*).
which is independent of Thus, can be chosen arbitrarily. If (53)
holds,
a Uf—r+
(50)1
Since the marginal utility of C, is always positive for risk neutral mdi-
viduals, they will choose to equal the upper bound, (Air) + 1, imposed
.by the constraint that the probability of bankruptcy must be zero. Finally,
suppose that (54) holds. In this case, 'P
a Eg(K*3)
F'(K,(C,), C,) = — r
+ (1 + K*) (Al
and the optimal C, is zero.
L
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Now suppose that I is risk averse and consider first the cases in which
(52) and (54) hold. Fix K, at any level and note that
(49) are
Eg(K.i)
(A14) —r+
Since u'(',i) > 0 and K* maximizes + K)), the expression
for the derivative in (A 14) is nonpositive if
here will Eg(K*,x)
i.e., if (52) or (54) hold. Since
C1) = Eu"(I, i)[ r
+
I
0. it will never be optimal to let C be positive regardless of K1. Thus, 0
and K is arbitrary.
Finally, we consider the case in which (53) holds. First, recall that it was
shown in lemma 3 that
tim
cI-=o
Because of this and the continuity assumptions made about u(.;i) and g,
lim = Fi(K*,0) = u(A + r,i).
us case,
For C, E (0,(Air) + 1], lemma 3 implies that K1(C1) is differentiable and
therefore continuous. Thus, F'(K1(C1),C1) is continuous on the entire
interval (Air) + 1]. It therefore attains a maximum C, on this interval.
We let K = K,(C,) and E, = C,.
It remains to be shown that > 0. If (3/0C,) F(K,(C,), C,) exists at C
= 0, the positivity of C,> 0 can be established by proving
If(53) —(A15)
Unfortunately, even the differentiability of u(.,i) and of g together with
(50) does not imply the existence of (3/aC1) F'(K,(O),O). As a result, a
at intji- more complicated proof is required.
nposed First, recall that, because of lemma 3, K1(C1) is a differentiable func-
tion of C, on (0,(A/r) + 1]. Thus, the differentiability of u(',i) and g
imply that (0/aC,) exists on this interval. Furthermore,
when this derivative exists, the envelope theorem implies that
(A16) = -r +
1
4 :
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The continuity of u'(.,i) and of g, the limiting result (50), and the Aumann'
expression (A16) imply that, for C, sufficiently small, 32: 394
C1) is approximately Baron,
(A17) u'(A + r, i) [ — r
+ (1 + K*) J' Debreu,t
DiamOni
which is positive because of (53). Thus, F(K,(C,) , C.) is a strictly iflCreas.. model!
ing function near zero. As a result, C, cannot equal zero; i.e., > o. 759—74
It should be noted that when (a/aC1) F(K,(0),0) exists, it equals the Drèze,
expression in (A17) and is therefore positive as required in (A15). QED. rium,
Ekern, S
Notes with ii
1. As mentioned in section 5.7, the introduction of a stock market may not improve
efficiency if N b This can occur because the stock market may not be Diamond efficient Gevers
in this case.
2. If, specifically, u(!, i) = — exp( — a.!), then it is easily verified that for each i, K.
where satisfies
=
I
ll -
E{FgK(K,x) —
- exp I = o.
(1+k) \l1 J (i+R)jJ tive 4
The equilibrium is completely described if we now let v = 11(1 + IC) Hart,
-1 incoll
a1
— ,[i—i ] (i÷R)
a1-1'1
'1'a —,
and
a,
—
(K
E{
uncd
I
/ (1+ k)J} Kihlsti
expl( I
Note that R is not equal to K*. preil
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Comment David Levhari
The paper by Kihlstrom and Laffont is another example of the efficient
use of the continuum of traders model to show the optimality of competi-
tion. In this particular application it is shown that stock market equilib-
rium provides a constrained optimum in Diamond's sense without having
to use the special assumptions on production and uncertainty that Di-
amond adopts in his paper. Kihistrom and Laffont allow firms to possess a
regular U-shaped cost function, and yet the equilibrium generated pos-
sesses the properties of sOcial optimum in Diamond's sense. Somehow,
the existence of a continuum of traders allows us to use some sort of a
"law of large numbers" so that the ensuing equilibrium is socially
efficient.
The assumptions of Kihlstrom and Laffont are also somewhat special.
All individuals have identical abilities, and all of them face identical
random variables. There are no learning possibilities, and no changing of
subjective probability distributions is allowed. All individuals are simi-
larly endowed. There is no distinction between control and ownership.
Thus, there is no distinction between the entrepreneurs and the firms
they establish in the aims of maximization.
David Levhari is professor of economics at Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
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With respect to the Aumann-like continuum of traders model, one
Dration wonders whether there is also a limiting theorem that as the number of
zew
. traders tends to infinity in a regular fashion, the market equilibrium
becomes efficient. That is, the question is whether a Debreu-Scarf struc-
certain ture can be established to prove that as the number of traders grows in
im and
some regular fashion, the market equilibrium tends to an optimal alloca-
tion.
Some of the questions that come to mind are as follows: What are the
Ekern- essential simplifications in Diamond that allow him to obtain his results
ence 5• without invoking a continuum of traders? Is the assumption in Kihlstrom
and Laffont that firms face identical random variables not oversimplistic?
a framework of similar nature in which firms'
ownership and control are not identical and the attitudes of the firms
tion of toward risky ventures cannot be identified with those of the entre-
preneurs?
)nomic The paper is thus an interesting use of the continuum of traders model
to show equivalence, in the Aumann sense, between equilibrium and
lechni- efficiency of allocation, and one may just wonder whether other realistic
and possibly more complex assumptions can be incorporated in the
present model.
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